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INTRODUCTION

Consider the following recent outbreaks - one a threatened pandemic and
one an actual pandemic. Each sickness was caused by a virus and for each, a
vaccine was or is being sought. In each case, a vital portion of an essential
upstream innovation was ostensibly subject to multiple patent applications or
patents. Moreover, ownership of the respective upstream innovation in
question was actually or possibly spread across multiple entities. These
general facts describe both the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ("SARS")
outbreak in 2002' and the HINI outbreak in 2009.2 In each instance there was
much social hand-wringing attendant to the actual or possible patent
fragmentation regarding vital intellectual property inputs necessary to combat
the diseases. The proposed or actual resolutions to the fragmentation,
however, differed tremendously between the two outbreaks. In one instance a
patent pool was proposed, and in the other a single for-profit secured exclusive
licenses from the other patent holders.
The ability of humanity to combat pandemics often entails the navigation of
intellectual property rights and, in particular, patents. These rights are
frequently fragmented among multiple owners or, to further complicate
matters, multiple potential owners. Perhaps not surprisingly, patent pooling
has been proposed as a mechanism to help address the possible pitfalls of
fragmentation. Given the exclusivity inherent in patent rights (and with it the
potential for market power) as well as the potential for interactions among
competitors, patent pools and other collective approaches to addressing these3
global public health threats increasingly raise possible antitrust questions.
I See Matthew Rimmer, The Race to Patent the SARS Virus: The TRIPS Agreement and
Access to Essential Medicines, 5 MELB. J. INT'L L. 335, 336 (2004) (indicating that the
SARS epidemic "had a significant impact upon the global economy" and that it "has been
variously described as a medieval plague, a medical disaster and an economic blight"). In
the first eighteen months after SARS's identification, the World Health Organization
reported 8098 known cases of infection and attributed 774 deaths to the virus. Id.
2 See generally Seth J. Sullivan et al., 2009 H1NJ Influenza, 85 MAYO CLIN. PROC. 64
(2010). "Within 2 months of its discovery [in April 2009] a novel influenza A virus (HINI)
... caused the first influenza pandemic in decades.. . . By June 11, 2009, nearly 30,000
cases of 2009 HINI had been confirmed across 74 countries . . . ." Id. Shortly thereafter, in
July 2009, resource limitations prompted the CDC and WHO to stop reporting confirmed
and probable cases of HINI infection. Id. at 67.
3 Professor Brodley's observation regarding the unique intellectual puzzle that joint
ventures pose provides a valuable perspective for this inquiry into patent pooling. Brodley
asks, "Why is it that normally competitive firms would join in a mutual enterprise?" Joseph
F. Brodley, Analyzing Joint Ventures with Foreign Partners, 53 ANTITRuST L.J. 73, 73
(1984). He further writes:
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Unfortunately, clear answers to such questions are not forthcoming to the
extent that current antitrust guidance regarding patent pools, whether in the
form of judicial rulings or agency pronouncements, is directed almost
exclusively to the very distinctive factual context of standard-setting
organizations.
This Article begins with "a tale of two diseases" which briefly discusses the
global health threats SARS and HIN1 pose. As becomes readily apparent,
however, the real story is much broader and concerns the suitability of patent
pools for overcoming the challenge that fragmented upstream patent rights
pose to downstream innovation.4 Society's understanding of the antitrust
consequences of patent pools has developed primarily in the context of
While vaccine development and such standard-setting
standard-setting.
activities in the computer, electronics, and telecommunication industries are
both characterized by fragmented upstream patent rights, they differ
significantly along at least two key dimensions. First, the standard-setting
process itself creates market power for particular technologies which are then
frequently pooled, whereas in the vaccine context the bottleneck technologies
have market power absent the pool. Second, the design of a standard creates a
high level of certainty regarding the relationships among the relevant pieces of
intellectual property. Such certainty is frequently absent in the case of vaccine
technologies where, for example, the significance of an input (e.g., essentiality)
may be unclear at the time of licensing. This Article employs vaccine
development as a concrete setting through which to explore the antitrust
aspects of pools for which essential inputs are less discretionary and, perhaps
counterintuitively, more uncertain.
In Part II, key aspects of the vaccine industry's patent, regulatory, and
competitive landscapes are described. Given those parameters and suspending
antitrust analysis, Part III applies basic economic reasoning to a series of
hypotheticals to analyze the relative value, if any, of patent pooling to
ameliorate challenges that patent fragmentation and technological uncertainty
pose. Part IV then reintroduces antitrust law as a possible constraint on
pooling arrangements, identifies two specific areas of the antitrust law (the
The task of antitrust policy is to separate the usual, economically desirable joint
venture from the occasional, anticompetitive joint venture. The fact that this is
sometimes difficult to do is what gives the subject of joint ventures its intellectual
fascination. The challenge is that the very quality that makes the joint venture
economically desirable, the fact that it brings together otherwise independent firms in a
common endeavor, can also create antitrust risk.
Id.
4 See generally Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency,
Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress,62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1020 (1987). Professor
Brodley forcefully advocates that the promotion of "innovation efficiency" should be among
the foremost goals of antitrust policy. Id. at 1025. "Innovation efficiency is achieved
through the invention, development, and diffusion of new products and production
processes that increase social wealth." Id.
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pooling of substitutes and the exclusive licensing of pools) that warrant
reconsideration, and offers recommendations. Current antitrust law and
agency guidance is seen to have both too much and too little to say about
patent pools within this particular context. While pooling is not the panacea
that some would make it out to be, its value to date arguably has been limited
by a lack of clarity regarding antitrust treatment of technological uncertainty.
I. A TALE OF TWO DISEASES
With regard to SARS, ownership of the relevant building blocks of the virus
necessary for creation of a vaccine could potentially be held by several
intellectual property rights holders. Four separate entities each "filed patent
applications that incorporated either parts, or the whole, of the genomic
sequence of SARS."s This circumstance was not surprising given that these,
and other, entities were engaged simultaneously in sequencing the SARS
virus.6 Multiple, potentially blocking patents, could, therefore, encumber the
genomic sequence that researchers need to develop a vaccine.7 Furthermore,
near simultaneous discovery of a single essential technology made priority of
invention (and hence ownership) uncertain. When those key applicants
indicated their desire to create a patent pool, the issue became how the antitrust
authorities would assess such an undertaking.8 Fortunately, the SARS
outbreak turned out to be more mild and short-lived than expected.
Consequently, the antitrust issues were not resolved.
In contrast to SARS, humanity has been less fortunate with regard to the
HINI influenza outbreak that the World Health Organization ("WHO")
officially declared a pandemic. 9 Interestingly, the intellectual property rights
landscape relating to HINI bears a certain similarity to that characterizing
SARS. With regard to HINI, however, the reaction to the fragmentation of
highly relevant intellectual property has not been to create a patent pool.
Instead, rights to a vital set of intellectual property rights, so-called "reverse
genetics" technology, were consolidated when a single, for-profit entity
(Medlmmune, Inc.) obtained exclusive licenses to key patents. Perhaps more

5 James H.M. Simon et al., Managing Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
Intellectual Property Rights: The Possible Role of Patent Pooling, 83 BULL. WORLD
HEALTH ORG. 707, 707 (2005).
6

Id. at 708.

7 Id. at 709.
8 Id. The law firm of Morgan Lewis and Bockius is providing pro bono services "for

discussions with the antitrust authorities." Id.
9 Press Release, Dr. Margaret Chan, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., World Now at the
Start of 2009 Influenza Pandemic (June 11, 2009), available at http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h Inl-pandemic-phase6 2009061 1/en/index.htmi.
"oPress Release, MedImmune, MedImmune Expands Patent Estate for Reverse Genetics
with New Rights from Mount Sinai School of Medicine (Dec. 7, 2005), available at
http://www.medimmune.com/news-pressroom.aspx?NID=793603.
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telling than this exclusive licensing scheme itself is the reaction, or lack
thereof, it has received from any number of key entities. The American
antitrust agencies do not appear to have offered any resistance, and the WHO's
Initiative for Vaccine Research seemed pleased that the exclusive rights-holder
has proclaimed that it will act benevolently."
An effective response to a disease outbreak requires the immediate
mobilization of scientific resources. Great forethought should be given to
identifying and, when possible, mitigating or even eliminating legal obstacles
to such mobilization. This Article critically assesses the role of antitrust law
and policy within this context. Would or should competition-related
considerations have impeded the formation of a potential SARS patent pool?
Would such issues have resulted in the SARS pool being structured or
restructured in a manner that satisfies the antitrust laws but is suboptimal along
other dimensions? What are the broader implications for deterring or
encouraging patent pool formation more generally? Conversely, ought
competition policy or antitrust considerations have impeded Medlmmune's
acquisition of exclusive rights to this important reverse genetics technology at
issue? What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of each of these (and
still other) intellectual property arrangements on innovation? Answering those
questions is highly fact-dependent. Nonetheless, this Article's efforts to
address those questions within the context of vaccines reveals important
market dynamics and tradeoffs that can help inform antitrust analysis in all
industries in which innovation requires access to potentially critical patents
with diffuse ownership and whose technological relationship to each other is
uncertain.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE VACCINE INDUSTRY
As a foundation for exploring the potential role of patent pools within the
vaccine industry, this Part introduces the key features of the industry's patent,
regulatory, and competition landscapes. While distinguished for ease of
1 For example, the Initiative for Vaccine Research ("IVR"), part of the World Health
Organization, described MedImmune's acquisition of the four patents believed critical to
development of the vaccine in order to combat the "highly pathogenic" strains of influenza
in the following manner:
Negotiating access to these [disparate patents] used to be complex, however these have
now been licensed exclusively to MedImmune Inc. (USA). This patent portfolio is
highly relevant to the issue of access to pandemic influenza vaccines . . . .
MedImmune, Inc., has taken steps to ensure that its patent rights do not inhibit the
development and commercialization of a pandemic influenza vaccine.
IVR, MAPPING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RELATED TO THE PRODUCTION OF PANDEMIC

INFLUENZA VACCINES 18 (2007), available at http://www.who.int/vaccineresearch/
diseases/influenza/Mapping-IntellectualProperty-Pandemic InfluenzaVaccines.pdf. The
IVR discussion document then acknowledges that "MedImmune has recently been acquired
by Astra Zeneca. It is not yet known what effect, if any, this acquisition will have on the
access to the reverse-genetics intellectual property." Id. at 19.
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discussion, these three dimensions are interrelated facets of the industry's
overall operating environment. Several key themes emerge from this overview
that subsequent sections will explore including: vaccine development
frequently requires access to multiple patents; ownership of key patents is
often fragmented; and, particularly during the early stages of research and
development ("R&D"), significant uncertainty exists regarding the value of
specific technologies. These factors can impede timely vaccine development
by creating transaction costs in licensing negotiations. In addition, fragmented
ownership can lead to inefficient cumulative licensing fees, which can
discourage development and/or end-use sales.
Before addressing the vaccine industry specifically, it is useful to place it
within the more general context of the pharmaceutical industry. Although an
oversimplification, the pharmaceutical industry colloquially can be divided
into at least two primary sectors: "drugs and bugs."l 2 "Drugs" refers to the
small-molecule arm of the pharmaceutical industry; that is, products that are
chemically synthesized. The majority of pharmaceutical products fall in this
category. "Bugs" refers to the biologics arm of the pharmaceutical industry;
that is, products that are created from living organisms such as antibiotics,
vaccines, and rDNA products. While this Article focuses upon vaccine
development, the relevant actors in the field are frequently intertwined with,
and increasingly dominated by, the drug industry. As such, the vaccine
landscapes delineated herein bear a strong resemblance to those characterizing
the drug industry.
PatentLandscape
America's intellectual property regimes were created in response to the
keen, albeit rudimentary, recognition of the potentially deleterious effect of
competition upon innovation. 13 Exclusivity enhances an innovator's ability to
generate returns on investment sufficient to justify undertaking oftentimes
costly R&D. Patents, the primary focus here, constitute both a response to
competition and, in turn, influence the nature of competition. Central to the
patent regime are key statutes that are relatively broad in nature and for which
common law development through fact-specific applications is of paramount
importance.14 To the extent useful generalizations can be drawn, they must
often function at the industry level.

A.

12I am grateful to my colleague Geoffrey G. Dellenbaugh, Ph.D., for numerous valuable
conversations and, more specifically, for this apt metaphor.
" See generally Hillary Greene, Afterword: The Role of the Competition Community in
the Patent Law Discourse, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 844-47 (2002) (arguing that patent
protection "can have a range of effects on innovation").
14 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1577 (2003) ("[D]espite the appearance of uniformity, patent law is actually as varied
as the industries it seeks to foster. A closer examination of patent law demonstrates that it is
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Patents play a central role in the pharmaceutical industry with regard to both
bugs and drugs. This Section briefly considers the role of such intellectual
property rights specifically within the vaccine industry in terms of the types of
innovations being patented, the number of patents being conferred, and
important consequences of those patenting trends. In so doing, it underscores
how such exclusive rights can both incentivize and deter innovation. The
complex relationship between exclusivity and innovation comes to the fore
given the existence of fragmented patent ownership and the importance of
sequential innovation.
Patent protection within the context of vaccines assumes numerous forms
including patents on various biologic products and methods of creating or
administering those products as well as future improvements.' 5 Like their
drug-based counterparts, these bug-based patents confer valuable exclusivity. 16
In fact, "[p]ioneer biologic drugs are covered by more and varied patents,
including manufacturing and technology platform patents, than small-molecule
branded products [drugs]."' 7 License agreements generally include a range of
provisions including: payment terms (e.g., royalty rates, upfront fees, or some
combination thereof), the term or length of the license, and other elements such
as whether the license is exclusive and whether it is restricted to particular
uses. License fees primarily allow the patent holder to recoup its R&D
investment, rather than reflecting some direct cost associated with the
transactions between licensee and licensor, since the marginal cost of giving
access to the actual intellectual property contained in a patent does not increase
with the use of the patent.
The manufacture of biologic products often necessitates a substantial
number of licenses which, in turn, "result[s] in significant 'stacking' of patents
(or royalties) compared to the small-molecule patent [products]." 18 One
scholar observed, "In the biotech and pharmaceutical industries, where [the
royalty for] a non-exclusive license to a 'must have' technology averages
unified only in concept. In practice the rules actually applied to different industries
increasingly diverge."). For a discussion of the biotechnology industry, see id. at 1676-87.
15 MICHAEL A. GOLLIN, DRIVING INNOVATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGIES FOR
A DYNAMIC WORLD 298 (2008) (delineating these different avenues of seeking patent
protection); see also EDWARD HAMMOND, SUNSHINE PROJECT, SOME INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ISSUES RELATED TO HSN1 INFLUENZA VIRUSES, RESEARCH AND VACCINES 4
patent
(delineating
http://www.sunshine-project.org/flu/patent-report.pdf
(2007),

applications relating to HSNl which include claims that "relate to adjuvants or other
formulation technology, sequences, production, or a combination thereof').
16 "[T]here is no evidence that patents claiming a biologic drug product [bug] have been

designed around more frequently than those claiming small-molecule products [drugs]."
FED. TRADE COMM'N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG
COMPETITION, at vi (2009) [hereinafter FTC FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC REPORT], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/06/PO083901biologicsreport.pdf.
17 Id.
18

Id. at 35 n.139.
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between 1-4% of net sales and [that of] an exclusive license averages between
6-10%, royalties can easily stack-up to 20% of net sales."' 9 The presence of
such royalties is significant because, "[o]ften, a burden of 8% versus 4%, for
example, can make the difference as to whether the vaccine is commercialized
at all." 20 Equally important, some of these necessary patents frequently lack
substitutes and, therefore, could directly block development of a particular
vaccine. 21
The most important biologic patents will oftentimes cover research tools
whose applicability extends beyond a single virus or vaccine and into broader
areas dealing with "reverse genetics and cell culture systems." 22 Even those
patents with more highly specific uses can significantly constrain R&D. For
example, "the holder of a gene patent can control any use of the gene for the
life of the patent [and as such,] the holder effectively has a monopoly over
diagnostics, prophylactics and treatments based on the sequence." 23 Stated
alternatively, the patentee controlling a gene sequence "can prevent others
from engaging in research involving the sequence." 24 This should be viewed
19 Anthony Williams, Governing the Innovation Commons: Private Ordering of
Intellectual Property Rights 11 (Mar. 2005) (unpublished working paper), available at
http://anthonydwilliams.com/wp-content/uploads/2006/08/Governing-theInnovation
_Commons.pdf; see also Keith J. Jones et al., Problems with Royalty Rates, Royalty
Stacking, and Royalty Packing Issues, in IP HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES, 1122 (Anatole
Krattiger ed., 2007), available at http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/chPDFs/
ch11/ipHandbook-Ch%2011%2009%20Jones-Whitham-Handler%20Royalty%20Stacking
.pdf (positing an example of vaccine development wherein "[w]hen the vaccine is ultimately
ready for use, it may be subject to royalty obligations of 6%-20%, or more, of the selling
price of the product").
20 Jones et at., supra note 19, at 1122.
21 Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel
and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REv. 303,
418 (2002) ("The foundational character of natural biochemicals and the necessity of
understanding and experimenting with them for the development of modem medical
diagnoses, vaccines, and therapies results in monopoly power for the patent holder. It is
usually impossible to 'invent around' a discovered gene, protein, or cell line in order to
avoid the licensing fee any more than one could invent around carbon, sodium, or any other
base chemical. This fact distinguishes biochemical patents from most other kinds of
patents." (citation omitted)).
22 HAMMOND, supra note 15, at 2. These two proprietary technologies have contributed
to the recent "wave of influenza-related corporate takeovers and technology deals inked in
the last two years." Id.
23 Lori B. Andrews & Laura A. Shackelton, Influenza Genetic Sequence Patents: Where
Intellectual Property Clashes with Public Health Needs, 3 FUTURE VIROLOGY 235, 236
(2008).
21 Id. at 236; see also Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protectingthe Public Domain of Science: Has
the Time for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REv. 457, 463 (2004)
(indicating that "upstream" patents in biotechnology "cover not just product markets but
also innovation markets -. . . the ability to carry out fundamental research. They cannot be

2010]

ANTITRUST AND THE VACCINE INDUSTRY

1405

as particularly troubling because step one in development of a vaccine is
sequencing the viral gene.
Within the influenza vaccine context more specifically, it has been argued
that there is "a much more complex and limiting field of intellectual property
claims than has ever before existed .

. .

. And it is going to get worse. "25 The

following statistics are revealing: "23% of all [patent] applications since 1983
for influenza vaccines (61 of 267)" were filed in the eighteen months spanning
2006 through mid-2007. 26 Half of those applications were filed in the United
States. 2 7
Another noteworthy characteristic of the intellectual property environment
for vaccine development is the particularly pronounced uncertainty
surrounding patents that are pending or have been recently issued. Such
uncertainty can be usefully divided into two categories: uncertainty regarding
patent ownership of intellectual property rights and uncertainty regarding the
scope of patent rights which, in turn, determines in part whether a patent does
or does not have substitutes.
In the United States, patent ownership is based on who is the "first to
invent" rather than who was the "first to file" a patent application. 28 Therefore,
patent applications filed by contemporaneous innovators can give rise to a
priority contest called an "interference." Interferences are "elaborate . . .
proceedings and legal standards" undertaken by dueling inventors to establish
legal priority.29 These priority contests are both time consuming and
expensive. The average pendency of an interference before the Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") is 30.5 months and "there are certain infamous
interferences that [have] continued for decades." 30 The average legal cost
associated with an interference proceeding has been estimated to range from
"$100,000 to as high as $500,000."3
While the high profile of the SARS interference is relatively uncommon, the
mere fact of its occurrence is not so aberrational. "The greatest number of
interferences . . . originate from Group 1600 (biotechnology)." 32 More
specifically,

invented around: for instance, any scientist who wants to study the genetics of breast cancer
needs to utilize the BRCA 1 test").
25 HAMMOND, supra note 15, at 3.
26 Id. at 4.
27 Id.
28 Id.

29 Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really
Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299, 1299 (2003).
30 Id. at 1331 n.99.

3' Ryan K. Dickey, The First-to-InventPatent PrioritySystem: An Embarrassmentto the
InternationalCommunity, 24 B.U. INT'L L.J. 283, 291 (2003) (citations omitted).
32 Current

Patent

Interference

Statistics,

http://www.aplf.org/mailer/interference-02.html;

Ass'N

OF

PATENT

LAW

FIRMS,

see also JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J.
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. was at least

2.5-fold the rate of declaration in any other technology area and was
about 6.5-fold the average rate of all other technologies for the 5 year
period ....
. . [S]taff in TC 1600 estimate that about 75% of interferences
declared in the center involve biotechnologies ...33
This data is consistent with the "very high levels of competition and, in some
cases, outright races for genetic discoveries .

..

[including] most recently the

quest for the sequence of the SARS virus." 34
Interference proceedings provide insight into one aspect of the uncertainty
that characterizes the patent landscape - that of priority of invention. In
addition to timing-related issues, another source of uncertainty is a more
pervasive ambiguity regarding the scope of issued patents and, by implication,
whether any individual patent effectively offers market power because of the
absence of viable substitute technologies. Patents are often characterized as
establishing "the 'metes and bounds' of [an] invention in a manner analogous
to real property deeds." 35 This analogy, however, is inapt since "[t]hose who
are intimate with the patent system have long understood that it is simply
impossible to define boundaries of invention with the physical or descriptive
precision of defining the boundaries of real property." 36 Consequently,
disagreements regarding the scope of issued patents are "pandemic." 37 These
disagreements are extremely difficult and expensive to resolve. As Professors
Burk and Lemley have observed:
It seems no exaggeration to say that no one reading the average patent
claim can begin to guess what that claim may be held to cover; that can

How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS
251 (2008) ("Research on interferences shows that a disproportionately large
fraction of interferences involve chemicals, including pharmaceuticals. 'The interference
rate for chemicals is 1.46 times greater than the average and drugs are interfered at over
three times the average."' (quoting Linda R. Cohen & Jun Ishii, Competition, Innovation
and Racing for Priority at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 12 (Univ. of Cal., Davis,
Dept. of Econ., Working Paper No. 050604, 2005))).
" Jon F. Merz & Michelle R. Henry, The Prevalence of Patent Interferences in Gene
MEURER, PATENT FAILURE:
AT RISK

Technology, 22 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 153 (2004) (citation omitted).

The TC 1600

group encompasses drugs, herbicides, pesticides, cosmetics, bioinformatics, and other
organic compounds, so this rate is not purely attributable to biotechnologies, much less
human genetics. Id. Detailed data that would permit greater discrimination of technology
involved or historical comparisons is unavailable. Id. (citing personal communication with
George Elliott, TC 1600, USPTO).
34 Id.
5 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1743, 1748 (2009).
36 Id.

3 Id. at 1750.
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only be known once the claims have been construed by [a district court
judge] and, realistically, only after the Federal Circuit has reviewed the
findings of the district court judge .. . .38
Consequently, even duly issued patents not plagued by questions regarding
priority have been characterized as constituting nothing more than "a license to
sue." Uncertainty may attach to issued patents as a result of not only questions
regarding scope but also more fundamental questions as to validity.
Licensing within biotechnology may be particularly challenging because the
uncertainty regarding the contours of specific patents is further exacerbated
when, as is often the case, the needs of prospective licensees are also difficult
to ascertain. Innovators undertaking R&D often cannot anticipate which
technologies and, therefore, which licenses they will need. This uncertainty
looms particularly large when the R&D is in its earliest stages. Given the high
degree of patent proliferation characterizing biotechnology and the vaccine
industry, and with it the potential for fragmented ownership of technologies,
successful vaccine development (from both a scientific and economic
perspective) is likely to be a function, in no small part, of how successfully
Unfortunately,
innovators navigate the intellectual property realm.
"[u]ncertainty over the prospective costs of licenses, royalty 'stacking' that
creates uncompetitive costs, delays in obtaining licenses . . . are all inhibiting
39
biotechnology R&D in many areas."

B.

Regulatory Landscape

Vaccine development is an extremely time-consuming and expensive
undertaking in part because of federal regulations. Federal law requires that all
drugs and biologics, such as vaccines, must be evaluated and approved by the
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") before they can be marketed in the
United States.40 Through its review, the FDA seeks to ensure the "safety,
efficacy, purity and potency" of all approved products. 4 ' This Section explores
key aspects of how the FDA evaluates vaccines. While the FDA's goal is to
ensure safety and efficacy, its regulations also have consequences for the
economics of the vaccine industry and, by implication, the value of patent
protection and the nature of competition.

3 Id. at 1791-92.
"The Federal Circuit reverses more than one-third of the claimconstruction cases presented to it on appeal, a far larger percentage than its general reversal
rate." Id. at 1751.
39 Anatole Krattiger et al., Intellectual Property Management Strategies to Accelerate the
Development and Access of Vaccines and Diagnostics: Case Studies on PandemicInfluenza,
Malariaand SARS, 2 INNOVATION STRATEGY TODAY 67, 74 (2006).
40 David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA's Efforts to
Preempt Failure-to-WarnClaims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 469 (2008).
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
41 Vaccines, Blood, Biologics, U.S.
BiologicsBloodVaccines/Vaccines/default.htm (last updated Mar. 29, 2010).
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Vaccines fall into the category of biologics and, as such, the FDA review
process varies in significant ways from that for drugs. While both drug and
vaccine manufacturers must comply with "good manufacturing practices," the
manufacturing requirements imposed upon biologics are "particularly
rigorous." 42 As a result, when the FDA approves a biologic such as a vaccine
it is, in effect, approving a plant for manufacture. One key consequence of this
approach is that a vaccine developer undertaking Phase III clinical trials to
develop statistically significant data regarding safety and efficacy must use
vaccines that were actually "produced in a facility that will be used for
commercial production if the vaccine is approved. As a result, manufacturers
must frequently invest more than $30 million in a production facility prior to
product approval." 43
The FDA's particularly stringent review of vaccines occurs not only during
the initial stages of vaccine production, but also through ongoing inspections
and testing. Vaccines, which are "produced from or use living cells and
organisms, as well as complex growth materials taken from living sources,"
must be monitored carefully for "purity and quality."" Further, "[ejach batch
must be carefully tested for composition and potency through a batch release
process. Unlike other drugs, vaccines are used on healthy people to prevent
disease; and as a result, vaccine production is subject to higher standards of
safety than is the case for pharmaceuticals." 45
The high sunk costs associated with the FDA review process are an
important reason for the emphasis upon the patenting of pharmaceutical
products generally. When the patent on an FDA approved drug expires,
generic manufacturers seeking to enter the market have historically
encountered a far less demanding regulatory review process. For a generic
drug, the FDA focuses primarily upon assessing bioequivalence between the
original product and generic drug. Until extremely recently, no federal regime
for generic biologics or "biosimilars" existed. Therefore, in addition to any
patent protection attached to a vaccine, the pioneering inventor was further
insulated from competition because any "generic" seeking to enter the vaccine
42 Lars Noah, Triage in the Nation's Medicine Cabinet: The Puzzling Scarcity of
Vaccines and OtherDrugs, 54 S.C. L. REV. 371, 380 (2002).
43 INST. OF MED., FINANCING VACCINES IN THE 21ST CENTURY: ASSURING ACCESS AND

AVAILABILITY 114 (2004) (citation omitted) [hereinafter IOM, FINANCING VACCINES],
availableat http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?recordid=10782.
4 Id. at 126.
45 Id. Vaccines, such as that for HINI, have received expedited reviews because the
vaccine in question is considered part of a class of vaccines (e.g., it addresses a different
strain of virus) that have already been reviewed. Perceived urgency may also play a role.
See Letter from Dr. Margaret A. Hamburg, Comm'r of Food & Drugs to Healthcare
Professionals (Nov. 10, 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Public
HealthFocus/ucm189691.htm. In highly unusual situations where an extreme emergency
need for a vaccine exists, a government could, at least theoretically, threaten direct
regulatory intervention to obtain pricing and distribution concessions.
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market would need to undertake the full FDA approval process. While this
Article was in press, a sweeping healthcare reform bill passed that would allow
biosimilars. More specifically, Title VII(A), Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation, requires the FDA to create an "approval pathway for biosimilar
biological products" though no biosimilars have yet been approved.46
The regulatory review process is a critical aspect of the vaccine industry.
The indirect, but nonetheless profound, effect of that process increases both the
risk and the expense associated with vaccine development, which, in turn,
reduces the expected return from development and commercialization. For
vaccines with limited demand (e.g., because the value is for only one season or
for only a small segment of the population), the increased fixed costs may
make development contingent on lower prices or exclusive access. Despite the
centrality of the regulatory review process to vaccine development, it is not
directly implicated in this Article's analysis of patent pools.
C.

Competitive Landscape

Professors Burk and Lemley characterize the biotechnology industry as
"properly described in part by the anticommons theory (too many narrow
patents must be aggregated to produce a viable product) and in part by prospect
theory (a long and uncertain post-invention development process justifies
strong control over inventions)." 47 This extremely apt characterization
provides insight into the interrelated patent and competition landscapes. The
anticommons aspect reflects the plethora of upstream R&D entities that create
and patent important biotechnologies required as inputs for further downstream
R&D. In contrast, the prospecting dimension implies that actual downstream
drug or vaccine development is likely to involve many fewer market
participants. This Section briefly discusses these key features of the vaccine
industry, focusing primarily on its cost structure and its implications for market
concentration and pricing. The discussion begins with the upstream R&D
portion of the market then examines the production and sales characteristics of
the downstream vaccine development and then manufacturing.
The upstream R&D portion of the vaccine market consists of a wide variety
These include integrated vaccine developers and
of organizations.
manufacturers and an important and growing sector of the biotechnology
industry which consists of small R&D firms and academic (and government)
entities. 48 These entities invest heavily in research and development and
46

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7002 (2010)

(amending 42 U.S.C. § 262).
47 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology's Uncertainty Principle,54 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 691, 738 (2004).
48 Walter W. Powell et al., Network Position and Firm Performance: Organizational
Returns to Collaborationin the Biotechnology Industry, in 16 RESEARCH INTHE SOCIOLOGY
OF ORGANIZATIONS: NETWORKS IN AND AROUND ORGANIZATIONS (Steven Andrews & David

Knoke

eds.,

1999),

available at http://www.stanford.edu/~woodyp/papers/Rsol.pdf
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produce innovations which are intangible and typically involve extremely low,
if not negligible, marginal cost to disseminate. Such innovations are generally
patented when possible. The intellectual property contained in these patents
may be useful across a wide range of downstream applications (vaccines
generally) or may be specific to a small class of R&D firms. Firms license
their patents either exclusively or nonexclusively. Such licenses can involve a
fixed fee andlor royalty payments. From the viewpoint of the vaccine
manufacturer, royalty payments to upstream R&D licensors represent a
marginal cost for each unit of sales.
Ownership of relevant patents may be spread across parties with widely
varying interests. This may influence licensing decisions and, in particular,
their (in)ability to form collective organizations such as pools. 49 For example,
MedInumune's reverse genetics technology is a combination of technologies
that originated with a for-profit, a research hospital, a medical school, and a
university.50
The economics of development and manufacture has contributed to the
downstream vaccine market's increasing vertical integration and consolidation.
Several primary forces contributing to this evolution include the extremely
high fixed costs characterizing further R&D and the manufacturing and
regulatory approval processes as well as the limited revenue prospects for the
vaccine industry, and the high level of complexity attendant to vaccine
manufacturing.
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") indicates that: "Biotechnology
innovation is costly and unpredictable, requiring significant amounts of
investment to test and commercialize new drug products."51 Patents "prevent[]
rival firms from free riding on discoveries." 52 With that state-conferred
exclusivity, the innovator can try to "recoup the substantial capital investments
made to discover, test, and obtain regulatory approval of new drug products." 53
These general features characterize the pharmaceutical industry as a whole as
well as the vaccine industry in particular: "Total development costs of bringing
a vaccine to market are roughly similar to those for drugs and can be higher." 54
The cost of taking a new vaccine from "initial research to commercial

(observing that the biotechnology field "is not only multi-disciplinary, it is multiinstitutional as well" and includes "research universities and both start-up and established
firms, government agencies, nonprofit research institutes, and leading hospitals").
4 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research,280 SCIENCE 698,700 (1998).
50 These institutions include Medlmmune, St. Jude's Children's Research Hospital, Mt.
Sinai School of Medicine, and Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation.
5 FED. TRADE COMM'N, FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC REPORT, supra note 16, at 1.
52 Id. at 30.
5

Id.

54 IOM, FINANCING VACCINES,

supra note 43, at 113 (citation omitted).
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production" has been estimated at $700 million.55 Moreover, "[o]nce a vaccine
has been approved, the production process involves high fixed costs relative to
variable costs. Fixed production costs, exclusive of up-front R&D and sales
labor, represent 60 percent of total production costs for vaccines." 56
Despite the fact that vaccine production costs "have generally been
increasing," their sales revenues "have remained relatively constant."57
Several factors appear to limit a vaccine's revenue potential. One factor is the
limited nature of the demand as only a "small number of vaccinations [are]
usually required" and most of those vaccines are "administered between one
and four times over a lifetime."58 Another contributing factor is that "vaccine
production costs do not necessarily decline over time." 59 Vaccine production
is subject to a "rigid batch inspection process, which makes it difficult for
companies to achieve more efficiency through a learning curve and to enjoy
cost reductions related to process improvements." 60 Finally, vaccine pricing
has been profoundly affected by the market power exercised by the U.S.
government qua purchaser including: "the CDC's ability to negotiate
discounted federal contract prices, federal price caps on certain vaccines since
1993, the gradually increasing public share of vaccine purchases (at discounted
prices), and the addition of price competition to the government contracting
process."61
These overall trends regarding costs, sales, and the high risk associated with
vaccine development, have contributed to the declining number of
manufacturers in the vaccine industry: "[T]he number of companies making
vaccines has decreased from twenty-six in 1967 to seventeen in 1980 and to
63
five in 2004 . . . ."62 This contraction reflects both exit and consolidation.
5s Id. at 114 (citation omitted). Vaccines often require greater upfront investment in
production facilities than do drugs. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. But,
"vaccines tend to have higher success rates than pharmaceuticals and may be characterized
by faster development times." IOM, FINANCING VACCINES, supra note 43, at 114 (citation
omitted).
56 TOM, FINANCING VACCINES, supra note 43, at 114 (citation omitted).
5 Id. at 116.
5 Id.
5 Id.
60 Id. (citation omitted).
61 Id. ("The principal exceptions to this revenue picture relate to two fairly new vaccines
- varicella and pneumococcal conjugate - which are priced higher than earlier vaccines.").
62 Paul A. Offit, Why Are PharmaceuticalCompanies GraduallyAbandoning Vaccines?,
24 HEALTH AFF. 622, 624 (2005).

63See Stanley A. Plotkin, Why Certain Vaccines Have Been Delayed or Not Developed
at All, 24 HEALTH AFF. 631, 631-32 (2005) ("The absorption of vaccine producers by
pharmaceutical [drug] companies has been inexorable, and it is argued that this arrangement
provides greater capital and synergy between pharmaceuticals [drugs] and vaccines.").
Plotkin, however, argues that other financing options may be "preferable" including:
"vaccine companies were the subject of public offerings"; "governments could also invest in
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Another important feature of the vaccine industry that results from
characteristically high fixed-costs is the desire of manufacturers to maintain
Since competition makes
high margins to recoup development costs.
maintaining such margins difficult, it is unsurprising that "[ciapturing entire
markets for specific vaccines is one of the goals of manufacturers, which are
expending sizable resources to develop new and unique vaccines. Monopoly
markets tend to have higher profits because the developer does not have to
share sales (or profits)."M Anticipated competition also means that
potential entrants [into specific vaccine markets] have little incentive to
invest in developing similar products [which are expected to have small
or modest sized demand] since they could not hope to recoup their R&D
costs unless they have a sufficiently superior product to command a
higher price or capture a dominant market share. 65
These aspects of the vaccine market have led some to conclude that, "given
the cost and demand conditions of most vaccine markets, long-term
equilibrium is likely to be one supplier or at most a few suppliers of each
vaccine type at any point in time." 66 It is important to recognize, however, that
even having a single developer does not mean that there are not multiple
potential developers vying to become the ultimate supplier. Consequently,
licensing negotiations for key patents held by upstream R&D organizations are
likely to involve one-on-one negotiations between the patent holder and a
small number of somewhat differentiated potential licensees.
III. INNOVATION, MULTIPLE TECHNOLOGIES, AND UNCERTAINTY

The vaccine industry brings to the fore - in a very concrete manner - the
nexus between uncertainty, intellectual property, and innovation. Part III
explores that relationship through a series of hypotheticals, loosely based on
actual circumstances, which illustrate the antitrust issues associated with patent
pooling in the vaccine industry. It begins with a simple example of a pure
priority dispute which underscores the significance of uncertainty regarding
timing issues. It then addresses increasingly complex settings characterized by
uncertainty regarding multiple technologies that are potentially relevant to the
creation and commercialization of a vaccine. Finally, Part III addresses
settings involving uncertainty regarding the technological relationships
amongst various patents. The analysis of each example begins by identifying
the particular challenges that the intellectual property environment presents to

companies that provide the vaccines for their populations"; and "special bond issues could
be issued for projects that reach the costly Phase III stage." Id.
I Margaret S. Coleman et al., Factors Affecting U.S. Manufacturers' Decisions to
Produce Vaccines, 24 HEALTH AFF. 635, 641 (2005).

65Patricia Danzon & Nuno Sousa Pereira, Why Sole-Supplier Vaccine Markets May Be
Here to Stay, 24 HEALTH AFF. 694, 695 (2005).
66 Id. at 695.
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vaccine developers and then explores the extent to which either patent pooling
or individual licensing could address the challenges posed by actual or
threatened upstream intellectual property fragmentation. The evaluations of
pooling and individual licensing hinge largely upon their respective
implications for transaction costs67 and pricing efficiency.68 The analysis of
these elements, in turn, indicates that patent pools are not a general panacea for
the transactional problems associated with individual licensing in nonstandard-setting situations characterized by the fragmentation of essential
property rights.69 While there are some potential benefits that pools may create
through more efficient pricing, such benefits will often be offset by transaction
costs that are special to pools and pool formation.
A.

Uncertain Timing

The challenge prospective vaccine developers frequently encounter is how
to acquire reliable access to essential patents swiftly. While society wants such
developers to act quickly, they may not do so if the property rights regarding
the underlying technologies are uncertain. One source creating uncertainty
deals with timing or, more specifically, priority of invention. As discussed
previously, patent ownership in the United States is determined by priority of
invention, rather than by priority of filing. Since priority of invention is
difficult to ascertain, ownership issues can easily arise. The fear of delayed
vaccine R&D owing to uncertain priority figured prominently in arguments
favoring pooling within the SARS context. This Section explores a
hypothetical involving a "pure" priority dispute in which the pending patent
applications are essentially identical. More specifically, it considers how
individual licensing, as well as patent pooling, could be deployed to address
this uncertain priority. Individual licensing is addressed because the extent to
which the parties could meaningfully account for the uncertainty at issue
through individual contract negotiations creates an important baseline for
transaction costs and pricing efficiency against which the pros and cons of any
pooling arrangement ultimately must be evaluated.
67

See infra Part III.A. I (discussing transaction costs).

See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing pricing efficiency).
The value of patent pooling within the biotechnology and related fields has received
considerable attention, primarily by commentators, owing to the perceived promise of
improved social welfare (including decreased transaction costs, increased pricing efficiency,
and faster innovation) and despite the acknowledged potential for antitrust issues. See
generally Krattiger et al., supra note 39; Simon et al., supra note 5; Willard K. Tom, A Field
Guide to Antitrust Issues in Standard Setting and Patent Pooling, 14 COMPETITION: J.
ANTITRUST & UNFAIR COMPETITION L. SECS. ST. B. CAL. 13, 28-29 (2005); Courtney G.
Scala, Note, Making the Jump from Gene Pools to Patent Pools: How Patent Pools Can
Facilitate the Development of Pharmocogenomics,41 CONN. L. REv. 1631 (2009); Patrick
Gaul6, Towards Patent Pools in Biotechnology? 9 (Ecole Polytechnique F~drale de
Lausanne, Coll. of Mgmt. of Tech., CDM Working Papers Series, CEMI-Report-2006-010,
2006).
68

69
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Consider a setting in which several potential vaccine developers exist and
each requires access to the same upstream innovation. The innovation is the
genomic sequence encoding the virus for which a vaccine is highly coveted.
Three upstream, non-vertically integrated,70 for-profit entities have pending
patent applications concerning the innovation in question. Each applicant
claims essentially the same invention and has an equal probability of prevailing
in the priority dispute. The applicant that filed its patent application first has
an advantage but is at risk of losing in a priority contest. Clearly, only one
pending application can be issued a patent.
Based on the profile of the vaccine industry, several other characteristics
reasonably can be inferred. With regard to downstream developers, only a
relatively small number of potential licensees are likely to exist. Also, any
prospective developer is unlikely to undertake the upfront investment required
to develop and commercialize the patented technology unless it has secured
licenses for all the essential intellectual property. Finally, owing to the nature
of the market (high sunk costs and relatively lower marginal costs),
prospective developers may be willing to pay a premium for an exclusive
license.
Given the uncertainty posited regarding ownership of the essential patent,
the interested parties could defer negotiations and decisions until after priority
has been resolved. At that point, each prospective licensee would seek to
acquire a license from the party prevailing in the interference proceeding. The
urgency to develop a vaccine, however, renders this approach untenable. Thus,
the question becomes how, if at all, could prospective licensees attain
sufficient legal comfort regarding technology access prior to the resolution of
the interference proceeding? Stated alternatively: would either a patent pool or
a series of individual licenses address the uncertainty in a manner that avoids
unduly stymieing innovation? The pros and cons of these two approaches are
best understood in relative terms. As such, this Section discusses the
transaction costs and price efficiency of each approach.
Prospective licensees could individually negotiate licenses with each patent
applicant. Such agreements typically provide for relatively small payments
upfront prior to resolution of the interference proceeding. Those licenses may
also provide for the transfer of know how or trade secrets from the patent
applicant to the licensee. More importantly, such agreements also contain
provisions detailing the terms for use if a patent ultimately issues. 72 The

See infra Part II1.C (discussing possible implications of vertically-integrated
licensees).
n1 See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing characteristics of non-profit settings).
72 See generally Daniel L. Reisner, Patent Licensing and Misuse Issues, in
DEVELOPMENTS IN PHARMACEUTICAL AND BIOTECH PATENT LAW (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademark & Literary Property, Course Handbook Ser. No. 944, 2008) (describing how
"pre-issuance royalties" can be structured as to avoid patent misuse). Reisner also indicates
70
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licenses with the unsuccessful patent applicants could effectively terminate
upon resolution of the priority contest. If a prospective licensee can procure all
necessary licenses, it can undertake the R&D investment with sufficient
comfort that even after the patent issues, it will not be subjected to either
downstream holdups on price or exclusion from the market altogether.
An alternative approach to individual licensing would involve the
prospective licensors forming a patent pool or, more accurately, a patent
applicationpool. The patent applicants would allow their pending applications
to be combined within a pool and licensed collectively rather than to be
Given the purpose of and
licensed individually by each applicant.
circumstances surrounding such a collective undertaking, the pool contract
would be contingency-based. It would establish the terms for the licensees
while the priority dispute is ongoing and the terms for use when a patent
ultimately issues. Sharing know-how is likely to be more difficult within a
pool setting given that the pool participants may be competitors.
The likelihood that either approach, individual licensing or pooling, will
emerge in response to the intellectual property-related uncertainty at issue is a
function of not only the antitrust law but also the respective consequences of
each approach for transaction costs and price efficiencies. In the case of pure
priority disputes, it will be shown that contingent contracting can mitigate the
costs to individual licensing caused by uncertainty over priority, making use of
pools unnecessary.
1. Transaction Costs
Kenneth Arrow has defined transaction costs as the "costs of running the
economic system."73 These costs are "the economic equivalent of friction in
physical systems" 74 and are invariably sought to be minimized. More

that "post publication/pre-issuance" royalties are justified in light of 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)
(2006). Id.
73 Kenneth J. Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the
available at
Choice of Market Versus Non-Market Allocation 1 (1969),
http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/-tedb/Courses/UCSBpf/readings/ArrowNonMktActivity 1969.
74 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 19 (1985).
Williamson elaborates:
In mechanical systems we look for frictions: Do the gears mesh, are the parts
lubricated, is there needless slippage or other loss of energy? The economic
counterpart of friction is transaction cost: Do the parties to the exchange operate
harmoniously, or are there frequent misunderstandings and conflicts that lead to delays,
breakdowns, and other malfunctions?
Id. at 1-2. Instead of focusing on production costs, transaction costs concern the
"comparative costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task completion under alternative
governance structures." Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted). Further, "[t]ransaction cost economics
poses the problem of economic organization as a problem of contracting. A particular task
is to be accomplished. It can be organized in any of several alternative ways. Explicit or
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specifically, transaction costs can be divided into "four separate costs related to
transacting: (1) search costs, (2) contracting costs, (3) monitoring costs, and (4)
enforcement costs."7 5 These costs can manifest themselves in terms of delay
(time costs) as well as actual expenditures. Within the patent pool context,
transaction costs include not only the costs associated with individual
transactions between licensors and licensees, but also the costs associated with
establishing and governing collective organizations which may participate in
such licensing transactions. The prospect of transaction cost savings through
pooling, as compared to individual licensing, is extremely well-trod ground
within the context of standards-related pools. Despite rather pronounced
differences from the vaccine market at issue herein, understanding the
standard-setting context is critical because it invariably constitutes either an
explicit, or at minimum implicit, point of reference for any antitrust analysis of
patent pools.
Standards-related settings are typically characterized by a very large number
of potential non-exclusive licensees requiring licenses to a large number of
patents held by numerous patentees. As such, the sheer number of potential
individual negotiations suggests that pooling could yield significant savings.
Moreover, the additional cost of establishing royalty arrangements within the
pool are lessened since the standard-setting process itself typically requires
identification of key patents and some general agreement, albeit extremely
vague, regarding royalty rates.
Within the vaccine context, however, it remains unclear whether pooling
would cause transaction costs to decrease in absolute terms or merely to
manifest themselves differently. One would need to compare the combined
cost of negotiating the pool formation and the pool's subsequent negotiations
with potential licensees with the sum of the costs incurred through individual
negotiations between disparate licensors and licensees. The magnitude of
transaction costs reflects in part the number of parties; to wit, the greater
number of individual negotiations, the greater the potential for transaction
costs savings with pooling. But as the number of negotiations in the priority
hypothetical, and arguably within the vaccine context more generally, is likely
small, one should be skeptical regarding the significance of volume-based
transactions as traditionally understood.

implicit contract and support apparatus are associated with each. What are the costs?" Id. at
20. Ex ante and ex post transaction costs
are often difficult to quantify. The difficulty, however, is mitigated by the fact that
transaction costs are always assessed in a comparative institutional way, in which one
mode of contracting is compared with another. Accordingly, it is the difference
between rather than the absolute magnitude of transaction costs that matters.
Id. at 21-22.
" Jeffrey H. Dyer, Effective Interfirm Collaboration: How Firms Minimize Transaction

Costs and Maximize Transaction Value, 18 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT J. 535, 536 (1997)
(citations omitted).
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A second important dimension for assessing transaction costs is the
complexity of the terms to be negotiated. As will become apparent, even
license negotiations involving a small number of parties may be extremely
complicated owing to the terms of the license agreement itself or the extent to
which one license's terms depend on the results of other simultaneously
negotiated agreements. The potential for significant delay associated with
complex negotiations has arguably been underappreciated in the patent pool
literature. This shortcoming is particularly unfortunate in the vaccine context
where development is frequently a race against both marketplace competitors
and the spread of disease, delay may be the most critical transaction cost.
However, in the pure priority hypothetical, there is no link across the licenses
since only one license will effectively be operational. Hence, any transaction
cost advantage, associated with priority uncertainty, that a pool enjoys relative
to individual licensing is not likely to be substantial.
2. Pricing Efficiency
How, if at all, will the mechanisms to address upstream fragmentation of
patent rights impact the efficient allocation of resources, i.e., the price
efficiency, in the market? Revisiting the hypothetical involving three for-profit
entities seeking to patent a single, essential technology, further assume the
technology has no substitutes and requires no complements. Therefore,
regardless of whether the licensors (patent applicants) price through a patent
pool or through individual negotiations, each should, in theory, seek a
monopoly price if it is awarded priority. 76 As a practical matter, pricing at the
monopoly level might not be easy as it requires, among other things,
understanding the elasticity of demand. While a pool could facilitate
information sharing along this and other dimensions, it is unclear whether this
would result in the price being set more accurately at the monopoly level or at
a level that increases or decreases social welfare relative to the individual
market price.
Through positing for-profit entities this and all subsequent hypotheticals
assume that market participants are profit maximizing. Some industry
participants, especially amongst those engaged in more upstream R&D are
non-profit entities such as universities or not-for-profit hospitals which
frequently invoke broader objectives such as the creation of knowledge for its
own sake, the dissemination of that knowledge, and/or improving social
welfare. These objectives may lead such organizations to pursue undertakings
that for-profit organizations deem poor investments owing to the anticipated
76 But see Tom, supra note 69, at 28-29, who argues that a pool involving sellers who
have patent applications that are contending for priority is welfare superior to independent
bargaining because independent bargaining will involve an inefficient price due to double
marginalization. He also argues that a group of patent applications, only one of which will
be granted, should be treated as functional complements for the purposes of antitrust
analysis.
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difficulty of appropriating much of the value from such projects. In terms of
pricing, such social objectives can emerge in a non-profit's willingness to
forego some profit if, by doing so, one of the organization's broader goals is
met. Non-profits do, however, usually have a strong incentive to maximize
their revenues on existing patents. To the extent that such an incentive
dominates, non-profits will essentially act as though they are profit maximizing
and will be indistinguishable from for-profits along many dimensions. The
implications of such diverse objectives for individual pricing warrants further
study.77 What are the pricing dynamics in pools consisting of both for-profit
and non-profit entities? Could, for example, non-profits act as moderating
influences or would for-profit incentives override such influences?
In sum, the uncertainty problems both the upstream and downstream firms
encounter in this hypothetical appear amenable to resolution through individual
licensing. No clear benefit inures to either licensors or licensees through
pooling the priority claims. Furthermore, any possible transaction cost
reductions attainable through pooling seem relatively modest given the number
of parties implicated and the ease with which individual licensing can be
implemented. Thus, in this setting a pool does not confer any advantages on
either the market participants or society.78 The hypothetical illustrates how
contingent contracting can mitigate various potential problems arising in
transactions involving uncertain priority. As will become apparent, however,
such contracting cannot solve all the problems that surface in vaccine
development markets.
B.

Multiple and Uncertain Technologies

In the pure priority dispute hypothetical, the uncertainty was extremely
circumscribed as it was solely a function of timing. 79 Another key source of
uncertainty vaccine industry participants encounter concerns the technological
relationship between patents (are they substitutes? complements?) and the
relationship between the patents at issue and the overall technology involved
(which, if any, patents are essential?). Such technological uncertainty is likely
to be greatest during the early stages of development which, unfortunately, is
oftentimes when licensing arrangements must be forged for development to
proceed.
To illustrate how uncertainty regarding technological relationships affects
the vaccine industry, this Section modifies the priority hypothetical along two
dimensions. First, more than one patent will now be required for vaccine
n Antitrust law applies to the actions of both for-profits and non-profits. While there has
been some recognition in antitrust law and policy that non-profits have somewhat different
incentives than for-profits, analysis usually begins by treating the two types of organizations
similarly.
78 There is a possibility that pooling patents may have some useful social incentives and
economic effects on parties that are not driven primarily by a profit motive.
79 See supra Part Ill.A (hypothetical positing three co-pending patent applications).
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development. Second, the technological relationship amongst the patents at
issue may or may not be fully understood during licensing negotiations. In the
priority hypothetical, A was not only an essential technology but it was also the
only patented technology required (the "single essential patent scenario"). The
modified hypothetical posits that three issued patents (A, B, C) are potentially
relevant to a vaccine's development. A is essential, but the technological
relationship between B and C is uncertain. To simplify the analysis, it is also
assumed that if B and C are substitutes, a licensee gains no additional value
from licensing both of the substitutes rather than only one of them. Patents
designated as substitutes are both technologically and economically equivalent.
Given this framework, the two possible scenarios this Section primarily
focuses upon are:
*

A + B + C: All three patents are complementary and essential

("complements scenario").
* A + (B or C): A is essential and either B or C is also necessary but
B and C are substitutes vis-h-vis each other ("substitutes scenario").
During negotiations, the prospective licensors and licensees are uncertain as
to which of these two technological relationships obtains. Presumably, that
technological uncertainty will be largely resolved over the course of R&D,
although legal uncertainty may persist.so These two scenarios reflect a
realistically cabined uncertainty in that profound uncertainty may exist
regarding certain technologies (B and C), while little or no uncertainty may
exist regarding other technologies (A). While the hypothetical pool is assumed
to include all potentially critical patents, in practice pools may contain only a
subset of such patents. Although many other combinations and permutations
are possible, reliance upon these two technological relationships is sufficient to
illustrate the key market dynamics.
This Section explores how prospective licensors and licensees could
proceed, given technological uncertainty, whether through patent pooling or
through individually-negotiated contracts. For expositional convenience, this
inquiry sometimes assesses, as an intermediate step, how the licensors and
licensees would interact if multiple known technologies were required. As
with the priority hypothetical, this analysis assesses the transaction costs and
pricing implications of pooling and individual licensing.
1. Transaction Costs
The two primary sources of transaction costs, discussed previously, are the
volume and the complexity of the interactions.8 1 This Section discusses the

The analysis of the modified
80 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
hypothetical assumes technological uncertainty will be resolved by the time payments are
made under the license. However, the basic lessons of the analysis are applicable to settings
in which technological uncertainty persists.
8 See supra Part III.A. I.
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nature of those costs and the potential ability of contingent contracting to
mitigate them within settings characterized by multiple technologies. In
particular, it explores how the combination of multiple technologies with
uncertain technological relationships exacerbates transactional frictions.
a.

Multiplicity and Certainty

The specific challenges attendant to navigating numerous licensing
agreements are illuminated by first considering a setting characterized by
multiple required patents with known technological relationships (i.e.,
complements or substitutes scenarios). For instant purposes, assume a
hypothetical for which those relationships correspond to the complements
scenario described (three essential patents A, B, and C) and further assume that
each market participant recognizes this technological relationship exists.
Under this scenario, any firm intending to develop a vaccine needs to secure a
license from each of the three patent holders. Assuming individual licensing,
the number of licenses to be negotiated is the same as within the priority
hypothetical. While a pool aggregating A, B, and C would reduce the number
of individual licensor-licensee contracts, establishing the pool would require
negotiations amongst the patent holders. Under either pool or individual
licensing, the number of negotiations is not large, so again significant volumebased transaction cost savings for patent pooling relative to individual
licensing is unlikely under the complements scenario. 82
Transaction costs are not, however, merely a function of the number of
negotiations involved. Negotiations can vary considerably in their complexity
with those that are more complex incurring greater transaction costs. As such,
it is important to recognize the extent to which the necessity of acquiring
multiple licenses, even if it is only a small number, can increase the complexity
of negotiations and, as a result, transaction costs.
Focusing solely upon the process of price formation, it is important to
recognize that the licensing terms emerging from one transaction may well
affect the course of related negotiations. For example, when a licensee
requires multiple licenses, its primary focus is on the sum of the royalty rates
rather than on the specific payments to any individual patent holders. As such,
under individual licensing, a licensee's negotiation with one licensor will be
driven to varying extents by earlier agreements between the licensee and other
licensors or the licensee's anticipation of what those agreements will entail.
The linkages across licenses in this hypothetical complicates negotiations and
starkly contrasts with the priority hypothetical where resolution involved only
one patent and, consequently, no interaction among license negotiations. The
complexity introduced through such indirectly linked transactions increases

82 This analysis applies to both exclusive and nonexclusive license settings, though in the
former only one firm needs to secure the three licenses.
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with the number of required licenses, but it is difficult to assess the
significance of such costs in the absence of specific facts. 83
The primary difference between individual licensing and pooling is that, in
the latter, the licensing negotiations regarding multiple technologies are
coordinated. This coordination reduces the transaction costs associated with
individual negotiations, but entails governance and pool negotiation costs. It
seems likely that as the number of coordinated technologies increases, the
market transaction costs which involve the number of interactions will
generally increase faster than the costs associated with pool governance which
is a function of the number of participants and licenses.
b.

Multiplicity and Uncertainty

Negotiating licensing terms given uncertain technological relationships is
potentially problematic as the parties may want to establish different royalty
rates or royalty divisions in response to different conditions. Uncertainty may
attach to both the question of which general technologies are implicated and
whether any specific technology is essential or has substitutes. This
Subsection explores the relative merits of individual licensing and pooling
given such uncertainty and, in particular, the relative abilities of these two
approaches to mitigate uncertainty through the incorporation of contingency
provisions.
Uncertainty regarding the underlying technologies increases the likelihood
of disagreement between the negotiating parties regarding royalty rates. Such
disagreement may, for example, increase the time needed to reach an
agreement. Because the parties recognize that basis for their disagreement
may become partially or fully resolved over time, contract provisions that are
contingent upon the future resolution of this uncertainty make a current

83 However, if exclusivity or near exclusivity is critical to induce vaccine development,
the negotiation frictions could multiply rapidly with even modest increases in the number of
buyers. See JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN & AARON B. WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION, at xi-xviii
(1973). A situation involving the negotiation of a series of exclusive contracts brings to
mind the point that "[tihe longer the chain of causality, the more numerous the reciprocal
relationships among the links and the more complex implementation becomes." Id. at xxiv.
"Experience with the innumerable steps involved in program implementation suggests that
simplicity in policies is much to be desired. The fewer the steps involved in carrying out the
program, the fewer the opportunities for a disaster to overtake it." Id. at 147; see also

Stephen A. Hansen et al., Am. Ass'N ADVANCEMENT OF Sa., THE EFFECTS OF PATENTING IN
(2006),
available at http://sippi.aaas.org/
THE AAAS
SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY

survey/AAASIPSurveyReport.pdf. A survey of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science regarding the "time taken to negotiate acquisition of technology"
revealed that the fastest technology acquisitions involved nonexclusive licenses of which
39% were "completed in under one month." Id. at 19. Whereas of those transactions for
which negotiations lasted more than six months, 33% were for exclusive licenses. Id.
Additionally, "biomedical science (26 percent) had the highest proportion of transactions
taking over six months." Id.
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agreement more likely. For example, a contingency provision that specifies
one royalty rate if the relevant patent later turns out to be essential and another
rate if it does not, offers a compromise that parties in disagreement may accept
more readily than a single (non-contingent) royalty rate. More quickly
consummating a licensing agreement is especially important if, as in the
vaccine case, delay is particularly costly.
One pervasive contingency-based clause in patent licenses is the
antistacking provision. Such provisions establish different royalty rates for a
particular license depending on the extent to which the licensee must acquire
additional patent licenses. The intent of these provisions is to mitigate the
present consequences of the uncertainty (and with it potential disagreement)
regarding what technologies will be needed. Consider the following example
illustrating how such an antistacking provision could be incorporated into an
individual license with A. The licensee agrees to pay the licensor, A, a
prescribed royalty rate which acts as a baseline. If the licensee needs to secure
additional licenses complementary to A (such as B or C) to practice A's
technology, then A agrees to permit a fractional offset in light of these
additional licenses. Oftentimes, such provisions permit a fractional offset
against the royalty rate, e.g., 30-50%, up to a maximum permissible amount.84
Antistacking provisions may also be useful in pool situations when, for
example, the pool does not contain all the necessary intellectual property.
While these contingency provisions generally will be quite useful, they are
less effective when addressing uncertain technology than when addressing
uncertain ownership as exemplified by the priority hypothetical. Recall that
the priority hypothetical addressed the underlying uncertainty through a
contract contingent upon whether a patent was awarded. Ex ante the parties to
the transaction (whether through individual licensing or pooling) establish one
royalty rate if the licensor is granted a patent and a different royalty rate (zero)
if the licensor is not granted a patent. Once the single patent at issue is
awarded, the uncertainty is resolved and the licensee's obligations under each
contract become clear. Resolution of the uncertainty is time-consuming but is
eventually clear-cut as only one applicant receives the coveted patent.
Resolving the residual technological uncertainty (and the oftentimes closely
related legal uncertainty), which would occur by the time payments are to be
made, may result in downstream transaction costs in the form of arbitration,
litigation, or settlement activities. Unfortunately, the determination of the
appropriate contingency can sometimes be influenced or obscured by the
actions of the licensee, thereby increasing transaction costs. Consider, for
example, an ex ante setting in which three scenarios are deemed as possible
outcomes: A and B are essential (C is unnecessary); A and C are essential (B is
unnecessary); and A is essential and both B and C are actually substitutes (one

I Jones et al., supra note 19, at 1122. If the licensor permitted the licensee to offset
entirely any additional royalties paid to third party licensors, then the licensee's incentive to
negotiate effectively would decrease.
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is necessary, the other is unnecessary). Now assume that B and C are
substitutes in that a vaccine developer, the licensee, could theoretically choose
between two paths (with comparable costs and likelihood of success) with one
approach using B and other approach using C. During manufacturing,
however, only B is used and C is no longer a potential substitute for B (they are
not plug-in substitutes). Stated alternatively, specific investments during the
development phase convert B into an essential input ex post despite it having
been a substitute ex ante.85 In this case, under individual licensing the
developer has an incentive to argue that B and C are substitutes and, therefore,
lower royalties should be paid to B, whereas B has an incentive to argue that it
is essential and that higher royalties are warranted. There likely would be no
hard evidence in support of the proposition that C was a viable alternative as
development did not proceed with C. Litigation or arbitration is a likely
outcome.
The interests of the licensors and the licensees are in opposition with respect
to identifying the applicable contingency. This opposition increases the
transaction costs associated with resolving the technological uncertainty.
Importantly, however, because these costs arise subsequent to the license
agreement, as long as such contingency provisions expedite the license
agreement such provisions should prove valuable in situations where delay in
development is the primary transaction cost.
Technological uncertainty has different effects on pool licensing and
individual licensing. Unlike individual contracts, pool contracts can offer
access to all the pool patents regardless of their respective essentiality or
uniqueness for a single royalty.86 Such an all-inclusive price would greatly
reduce disagreements between the licensor and licensee stemming from
technological uncertainty, e.g., the licensee is indifferent as to whether B or C
are essential or are substitutes.87 However, this inter-organization advantage
would be traded off against potential intra-organization disputes regarding the
division among pool members of payments received by the pool as a whole. In
much the same manner that deftly deploying contingency provisions could
expedite agreements in individual licensing cases, they could also facilitate
pooling if profit division depended on a subsequent determination about
technological relationships.
It is difficult to assess the absolute size of transaction costs associated with
profit division within a pool. However, it is likely that such costs will be
greater when the patent pool contributors diverge in terms of the essentiality of
their respective patents. For example, the transaction costs may be lower when
8 See generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 74.
86It is also possible for pool contracts to contain contingencies based on need and
essentiality.
87 But see infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing how the prospect of renegotiation may render
even a pool licensee interested rather than indifferent to the resolution of such technological
uncertainty).
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the complements scenario is more likely than if the substitutes scenario is more
likely because, in the former context, price negotiations are likely to be less
contentious (all are essential) than amongst patent holders in the substitutes
setting, where there is likely to be heated dispute over the probability and
degree to which some of the patents are potential substitutes.
Ultimately, there does not appear to be any general rule that can establish a
relative advantage of a pool over individual licensing with respect to
transaction costs stemming from uncertain technology. Key questions in
determining relative advantage are the extent to which technological
uncertainty is a major obstacle to coming to an agreement (e.g., between
licensors and licensees or among pool members), how effective contingency
provisions are in reducing this obstacle, and the likely size of ex post
disagreement costs. Contingency provisions help in both cases and the pool
will not have the transaction costs associated with linkages across license
The latter observation suggests that when there are many
contracts.
technologies that would be included in a pool, transaction costs will generally
be lower for a pool than for individual licensing. Nonetheless, the answers to
these questions and the advantage of one form over the other will be situation
specific.
2. Pricing Efficiency
To evaluate the relative abilities of individual licensing and patent pooling
to address technological uncertainty involving multiple technologies, it is also
critical to understand their respective impacts upon pricing outcomes. Under
individual licensing, pricing is established through market interactions in
which each party seeks to maximize its individual profit. Patent pooling alters
the pricing dynamics by coordinating licensors so as to maximize their joint
profit which is then allocated internally. After expanding upon these different
pricing dynamics, this Subsection examines the relative efficiency of the price
outcomes under each regime.
This Section's treatment of pricing efficiency contains two simplifying
assumptions. First, it focuses solely upon royalty-based licenses rather than
payments in the form of lump-sum transfers or lump-sum transfers combined
with royalties. Second, it assumes that individual licensees (buyers) lack the
market power to influence pricing. While the licensees are assumed to behave
competitively, the licensors (sellers) may enjoy varying degrees of market
power. These assumptions, discussed below, do not affect the conclusions
drawn. As with the preceding transaction costs discussion, this Section first
explores pricing within the context of multiple, known technologies (the
complements and substitutes scenarios) and then introduces the complication
of uncertain technological relationships.
a. Multiplicity and Certainty
Assuming the presence of multiple technologies with certain relationships,
the hypothetical developed allows for two possible scenarios: the complements
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scenario wherein A, B, and C are each essential and the substitutes scenario
wherein A is essential along with either B or C.
The complements scenario under individual licensing, with the
interdependence of A, B, and C, illustrates what the economic literature refers
to as "Coumot complements." The problems of pricing within that setting are
well recognized. Each patent holder has market power and could, in theory,
charge a royalty rate (a "monopoly" rate) which reflects its essentiality.
According to the Cournot model, if a series of such individual licenses were
negotiated, the licensors would charge rates reflecting their respective
monopoly power. The resulting combined royalty rate would be greater than
both the rate that maximizes the licensors' joint profits and the rate that
maximizes social welfare. Thus, a reduction of the de facto joint price would
increase joint profits while also reducing the price distortion induced by the
licensors' market power. 89 The licensors' prices are excessive because any
individual licensor accounts only for the effect of its price increase on its own
profits (increase in price per unit traded off against a decrease in the number of
units sold). However, the individual licensor does not account for the effect of
its price increase on the other licensors' profits, which are always negatively
affected. That is, no licensor gains additional per unit profits from another's
price increase, but each licensor does experience a loss in unit sales. 90
Pooling helps mitigate inefficient Cournot pricing because the pooling firms
internalize the effect that an increase in price has on the profits of all licensors.
Since pricing is chosen to maximize joint profits, the possible net benefit of a
price increase is calculated for the entire group of licensors. Pooling,
therefore, will lead to a lower overall royalty relative to individual licensing. 9 '
Furthermore, economic analysis indicates that the profit-maximizing pool price
will be the same price that a single monopoly input provider (e.g., only A is
essential) would charge. 92 Increasing the number of essential inputs does not
increase the ability of a single entity to extract profits from the downstream
licensee, since there is a single monopoly profit. Henceforth, this Article will
refer to this profit-maximizing pool price as the "single monopoly price."
While this Article invokes the single monopoly profit theory within a
horizontal context, it is most commonly associated with contexts involving
vertical integration such as tying. Within such contexts, "[a] firm with a
88Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEx. L.

REv. 1991, 2013-14 (2007).
89 Id. at 2011 ("[T]he aggregated or stacked royalty rate is not simply the sum of the
royalty rates that would be negotiated bilaterally by each patent holder in the absence of the
other patent holders.").
9 Id. at 2013.
9! See Richard J. Gilbert, Antitrustfor Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evolution, 2004
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3,

Id.
price).
92

1[

25-26.

1 25 (demonstrating that a patent pool maximizes revenue at the single monopoly
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monopoly at one level of the chain gets all of the monopoly profit if it charges
a monopoly price and everyone else in the chain charges a competitive
price." 93 The licensor, therefore, would not benefit from extending its
monopoly within a given supply chain because it would be unable to increase
its profits. 94 Regardless of the context, the underlying theory turns upon
identifying those circumstances not susceptible to monopoly leveraging. Over
time, extensive analysis in the economics and legal literature has led to a
clearer understanding of the conditions under which this theory does or does
not apply. The most frequently cited prerequisite for its applications is that the
inputs, whose control is at issue, must be required in fixed proportions. 95 This
condition is clearly met by the circumstances at issue herein where essential
patents are required for vaccine development. That is, every unit of output
requires access to each essential patent.
What are the implications of the single monopoly profit theory for pricing
under the substitutes scenario? Clearly, this scenario also contains a
complementary element because it is essential that either B or C supplement A.
Therefore, individual pricing will reflect both the complementary relationship
between A and B or C and the substitute relationship between B and C. As
such, aspects of the pricing dynamics characterizing the previous complements
scenario have continued relevance within this altered setting. The new element
warranting consideration is the degree of competition between B and C.
A's profit maximizing royalty rate reflects the competition between B and C
as well as the interaction of B and C with A. The outcome of the pricing
interactions reflects the degree of competition between B and C, which could
range from minimal to intense. A full economic analysis of this wide range of
competitive interactions falls beyond the scope of this Article. However, one
can glean the key dynamics by comparing pricing outcomes at the two
extremes of competition between B and C.
Recall from the Cournot complements pricing discussion that individual
licensing in the presence of complements results in each patent holder reducing
its own royalty rate to a level below its own monopoly price. 96 A's royalty,
under the substitutes scenario, will also be less than the single monopoly price
because a complementary input is still necessary. However, A's royalty will
increase as the competition between B and C intensifies and, in any event, will
be greater than it would have been under the complements scenario (A + B +
C). Competition between B and C forces each to lower its royalty relative to
what they would have charged if their inputs were essential complements. If
the competition between B and C is sufficiently intense, it is possible that they
9 David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, DesigningAntitrust Rules for Assessing Unilateral
Practices:A Neo-ChicagoApproach, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 73, 77 (2005).
94 Id.
9s See generally Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARv. L. REV. 397 (2009).
96See supra Part III.B.2.a.
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will license their respective patents at or near marginal cost (the competitive
outcome). Under such circumstances, A should be able to negotiate a royalty
rate that equals or approximates the single monopoly price. Competition is bad
for B and C but good for A. The combined royalties a licensee pays will
exceed the single monopoly price and hence the joint profits will likely
increase with increases in competition.
Consider now a pool that includes all three patents and in which B and C are
substitutes ("substitutes scenario"). Such a pool would be problematic under
current antitrust law.97 Nonetheless, consideration of such a pool is necessary
to understand whether (assuming no legal prohibition) such pools would form,
the potential consequences if they did, and the basis for their prohibition.
Antitrust discourages the pooling of substitutes owing primarily to the
concern that it would provide a mechanism for collusion between competitors.
This price-fixing concern is particularly well-founded if the pool contains only
B and C. The presence of essential patent A, however, helps mitigate the
negative price effect. Assuming the conditions exist that support the single
monopoly profit theory, then a pool consisting of the three patents (A, B, Q
would license the pooled technology (including the substitutes) at the same
price that would obtain if there were only one monopoly input. 98 This price
will be lower than the combined prices under individual licensing. The lower
pool price also represents a social welfare improvement over individual
licensing.
Thus far, this Article has focused primarily upon the overall price efficiency
of pools once they are formed. Additional factors warranting consideration
include how pool profits will be divided among the members, whether a pool
will form, and what are the competitive consequences of failed pool
negotiations.
Assuming voluntary participation, each pool member must receive at least
as much profit through the pool as it would have earned through individual
licensing. Within the substitute scenario, all of the prospective pool members
will not want to divide the profits equally. A's interests run counter to the
incentives of B and C to cooperate to raise their share of the pool profits at A's
expense. This results because, as discussed within the individual licensing
analysis, A's individual royalty increases as B and C compete more intensely.
Thus, as the individual licensing situation is more competitive for B and C than
the pool, A will require the more competitive B/C pricing (in terms of profit
division) as a condition of its participation. Nonetheless, a profit division
satisfactory to all participants should be possible because when the profitmaximizing pool price is the single monopoly price, there are some additional
profits will accrue under pooling versus individual licensing. Furthermore,
these profits do not come at the expense of social welfare because B and C

9
98

See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the antitrust implications of pooling substitutes).
See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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cannot price fix in a manner that simultaneously decreases social welfare but
increases their respective profits.
Contentiousness regarding profit division has some potential to increase the
transaction costs associated with pool formation. This is especially true as the
likelihood of the substitutes scenario increases. Part of the problem is that pool
formation depends on agreement regarding profit allocation. However, the
appropriate allocation depends on the degree to which B and C compete which
is likely to be a point of disagreement between A (arguing for significant
competition) and B/C (arguing for little competition).
In sum, pooling confers a pricing benefit upon both the licensors and society
vis-A-vis individual licensing when there are multiple essential technologies
with known relationships (whether the complements or substitutes scenario
obtains). This pricing efficiency increases as the number of essential patents
increases. The next Subsection introduces the further complication of
uncertain technological relationships.
b. Multiplicity and Uncertainty
The effect of technological uncertainty on pricing efficiency can be explored
by modifying the hypothetical with the additional assumption that at the time
of licensing the parties to the license are uncertain whether the relationship
amongst the various patents corresponds to the complements or the substitutes
scenario. Contingency provisions can mitigate not only the problems
associated with the uncertainty regarding timing demonstrated in the priority
hypothetical analyzed previously, but also the uncertainty regarding
technological relationships. For example, a license can specify different
royalties depending on whether B and C are found to be complements or
substitutes. Using contingency provisions to mitigate uncertainty problems,
however, does not alleviate the pricing inefficiency that is fundamental to the
individual licensing of complementary patents.
The magnitude of the salutary effects attendant to contingent contracting
depends, in part, on the extent to which resolution of the technological
uncertainty is clear-cut and easily verified by third parties. If resolving the
relationship between B and C is difficult, it creates the potential for future
disputes. Such disputes may reflect somewhat more contrived positions.
These considerations greatly complicate predicting ultimate pricing outcomes,
which this Article does not attempt.99 Nevertheless, this Article next explores

9 The transaction costs discussion remarked that the interests of the owners of the
potential substitutes B and C conflict with the interests of the licensee. It then explored how
A prefers strong competition between B and C and, hence, A would also prefer to argue for
the substitutes outcome (which has some competition between B and C) over the
complements outcome (no competition between B and C). These tensions, of course,
underscore that there are no disinterested parties involved in the transactions. Moreover, the
parties involved are likely to be the best informed about the underlying technologies. To the
extent that these ex post disputes may also be resolved through renegotiating royalties, this
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some of the consequences flowing from contingent contracts and residual
uncertainty.
With regard to individual licensing, if a downstream dispute seems
reasonably probable, then it will likely be reflected in the ex ante licensing
negotiations. More specifically, increased transaction costs may characterize
the ex ante negotiation because when greater latitude for disagreement exists,
greater attention is warranted when specifying the contingencies. The pricing
effect is less clear. If the parties incorporate contingency provisions, the
pricing terms underlying each contingency should reflect each party's
assessment of the anticipated dispute and its resolution. Pricing in the license
contract may be distorted as each party seeks to establish a superior
downstream negotiating position or to move each price in the direction of the
"average" price across the contingencies to reduce risk. At the extreme, some
parties might choose to eschew contingency provisions, in effect, sacrificing
some profits to enhance predictability and avoid downstream disputes.
Similar disputes would exist between a pool qua licensor and a licensee if
the pool license were contingent upon the technological relationship. But if a
single monopoly price is the optimal pool price under either technological
relationship, then contingency provisions are unnecessary and the uncertainty
will not affect pricing and transaction costs regarding the licensor-licensee
contract. While the pool, relative to individual licensing, will reduce disputes
between the licensors and licensees, the nature of the technological relationship
still has potential implications for the division of pool profits. As discussed,
the share of profits that the owner of essential patent A can legitimately claim
will increase in the substitutes scenario relative to the complements scenario.10
Also, because the internal profit division will not impact the amount of profits
overall (i.e., the division does not distort the number of units sold given a
single monopoly price), the pool can likely establish a single division of profits
ex ante more easily than a licensee and differently motivated licensors could
agree to a single royalty price for each contract regardless of technological
relationship.
In sum, pool licensing involves different transaction costs than individual
licensing. At its most basic, pooling becomes relatively more attractive when
the transaction costs of individual licensing exceed the costs of pool formation
and governance. Even if volume-based transaction costs are unlikely to be
significant, as the complexity of the individual transactions increases; this
value will increase nonlinearly with the number of transactions. The pool
enables coordinated pricing, which can translate into price efficiencies that
benefit both pool members through increased profit and consumers through

alters the welfare effects associated with the pricing. As prices can increase or decrease,
there is no obvious prediction regarding the welfare effects of the renegotiation.
10 One difference between the licensor-licensee group and within the licensor group
disputes is that the licensors are likely to have less special information advantages relative to
each other about the technology relationships than would the licensee.
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lower prices. For small numbers of essential patents, the costs of pool
formation and governance could be large enough to more than offset the
advantages pools have over individual licensing. On the other hand, pools
involving large numbers of patents would appear to offer some benefit over
individual licensing.
These general observations regarding pricing efficiency reflect, in part,
several underlying assumptions. The remainder of this Section will address
two of them. The first assumption is that licenses will be heavily weighted to
royalties rather than a combination of royalties and an up-front payment. The
second assumption is that the licensee (buyer) market power is insignificant
relative to licensor (seller) market power.
This Article's pricing analysis assumes that payments to licensors are made
via royalties rather than as upfront payments. Within the biopharmaceutical
industry, while royalties are not the most efficient mechanisms as a matter of
economic theory, they are clearly the most important mechanism as a matter of
practice.' 0 ' Within the vaccine context at issue it is technically more efficient
for the royalty rate to be set at marginal cost and for the profits to be conveyed
through an up-front payment that is independent of unit sales. This pricing
scheme avoids the resource allocation inefficiencies that would otherwise
result from end-user demand distortions caused by royalties that exceed
marginal cost. In practice, however, most of the upstream profits come
through royalty payments.' 02 This reliance results in large part from the
sizable risk involved with predicting future demand and profits on a product
that has not yet been developed and for which demand may also be unknown.
If most of the payments to upstream patent holders came via a lump sum
payment, then even if the vaccine was not successfully developed or if demand
was weak, the manufacturer would still have to pay the lump sum whereas
with a royalty-based contract there would be little or no payment.
For a given level of licensor profit, higher up-front payments and lower
royalties yield more socially efficient pricing. Up-front payments also enable
the licensor to extract rents from the licensee more efficiently because the
licensor can profit without inducing a reduction of end-user sales (which would
otherwise occur with an increase in the royalty rate). This analysis applies to
both individual licensing and pool licensing. Further study would be valuable
to understand how increased reliance upon up-front payments would affect the

101Ass'N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING ACTIVITY SURVEY: FY

2008 SURVEY SUMMARY 38 (2010) (indicating that running royalties accounted for
approximately 80% of total payments for university licenses in FY 2008); LICENSING EXECS.
Soc'Y, BIOPHARMACEUTICAL ROYALTY RATES & DEAL TERMS REPORT 67 (2008) (surveying

biopharmaceutical deals in the mid-2000s and collecting responses from about twenty-one
deals for which the average up-front payments was 15% of the net present value of the deal
with a median of 7%).
102 Id.
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relative differences between pooling and individual licensing in terms of price
and transaction cost efficiencies.
This Article has not specifically delineated what, if any, downstream market
power exists within the hypothetical. The potential licensees, as described in
Part II, are firms in an oligopolistic industry and hence might be expected to
have some market power, albeit less than that possessed by an essential patent
holder.103 As a general matter, licensee market power should exert a
downward force on royalty rates in both the individual and pool licensing
situations. If there are many essential patents, then the combined royalty is
likely to exceed the single monopoly royalty rate even when the licensees have
substantial market power. For example, assume that licensee market power is
quite strong and, as a result, the negotiated royalty for each license lies halfway
between the monopoly and the competitive levels. Under those circumstances,
and further assuming numerous required licenses, the combined individual
royalties would exceed the single monopoly royalty. As such, while a patent
pool would still offer superior price efficiency relative to individual licensing,
the size of the efficiency would be less than if there was no licensee market
power. In contrast, if licensee market power is substantial and there are very
few patents at issue, then it is possible that the combined individual royalty
rate would be below the single monopoly royalty rate. In this case the price
efficiency advantage of the pool is unclear, because the licensors' single
monopoly royalty rate is greater than the sum of the individual licensing
royalty rates. The pool has an incentive to try to raise the pool royalty rate
higher, towards their ideal monopoly rate, but the market power of the
licensees will still be a countervailing force. Much depends on whether the
pool somehow increases the relative market power of the licensors. This
situation requires further analysis that is beyond the scope of this Article.
C.

Exclusivity

This Article has explored a series of hypothetical licensing arrangements
wherein the relationship between the licensor and licensee was either nonexclusive or unspecified. The insights developed, however, are generally
applicable to exclusive licenses as well. Acquiring exclusivity over inputs
often facilitates a licensee obtaining exclusivity in the output market, which is
a common objective in the vaccine industry. This Section explores some
unique issues regarding both transaction costs and pricing efficiency, that
exclusive licensing can introduce regardless of whether that exclusivity is
The standard Cournot complements model assumes that the downstream purchasers
of the intermediate good have no market power. This is the simplest circumstance to
analyze because it involves no negotiation between the upstream and downstream firms.
Price is set by either a monopolist patent holder or through upstream competition and the
licensees are price-takers. At the other extreme is a setting in which an upstream
monopolist faces a downstream monopsonist. Price negotiations would ensue and the
outcome is indeterminate.
103
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achieved through individual licensing or patent pooling. These additional
issues are the effect of exclusivity on decreasing licensee competition, the
increased risk to a licensor of relying on a single developer when development
success is not certain, a coordination problem that manifests when there are
multiple essential technologies, and the foreclosure incentives of a licensor of
an essential patent who is also a downstream developer and licensee of other
technologies. The contours and wisdom of antitrust law and policy regarding
exclusivity are addressed in Part IV.
The vaccine developers, the licensors in the hypotheticals, may seek
exclusive contracts which offer the prospect of higher profits by eliminating
competition for vaccine sales. Eliminating such competition both raises the
final good's price and ensures that the entire market's sales go to the exclusive
developer. Reducing competition generally harms consumers unless market
demand is insufficient to support more than a single development effort.
As discussed in Part II.C, vaccine markets have a number of characteristics
that favor exclusivity. Oftentimes the markets are quite small and the demand
may be highly uncertain especially when vaccine development (for a disease
such as influenza) is based upon the projected size and severity of the
anticipated outbreak. Two additional characteristics of the vaccine market
more generally warrant further consideration. First, the purchasers are often
governments who wield substantial market power owing to volume
purchasing. With such buyer power, prices may be forced substantially below
monopoly levels. Second, the vaccine markets appear susceptible to tipping in
the sense that the better of multiple vaccines, even if it is only slightly superior,
may effectively dominate the market despite substantial discounting of the
comparatively inferior vaccine.'10 While this winner-take-all scenario still
offers equally situated developers the same expected sales, it increases the risk
the developers bear. 05 Overall, these factors decrease the risk-adjusted profits
that a developer can expect and, therefore, reinforce the need for greater
market demand to justify multiple development efforts given the substantial
R&D costS.106
' That is a function of multiple factors, including the paramount importance of
inclusion on the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices ("ACIP") list. See
Danzon, supra note 65, at 695; see also Dep't of Health & Human Servs. & Ctrs. for
Disease Control & Prevention, General Recommendations on Immunizations:
Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 55
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 3-4 (2006), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/PDF/rr/rr5515.pdf.
15 An offsetting factor is that a market that tips to monopoly has greater profit potential
than does a duopoly market.
106Even if licensees do not need exclusivity, the licensees may attempt to acquire at least
one exclusive contract to ensure themselves of a bargaining chip to gain access to other
essential technologies. Furthermore, because successful product development is uncertain, a
vaccine monopoly may emerge despite non-exclusive contracts for inputs when only one
vaccine developer succeeds.
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From the social standpoint, therefore, exclusivity can be competitively
justified when the anticipated market demand is less than necessary to cover
fixed R&D costs for multiple developers.10 7 Unfortunately, as costs are private
and demand subject to debate, arguments favoring exclusivity can also be
proffered disingenuously where demand is sufficient to support more than one
developer and exclusivity is merely a means to achieve higher profits.
One method to obtain exclusivity in the output market, assuming successful
development, is by acquiring exclusive access to at least one essential patent as
well as non-exclusive access to all other needed patents. But gaining such
rights requires that at least one licensor of an essential patent be willing to
license its patent on an exclusive basis. Licensors should prefer exclusive to
nonexclusive contracts because the anticipated licensee profit associated with
exclusivity is greater than the sum of the profits from multiple licensees and,
therefore, a licensor should expect a larger payment with an exclusive contract.
However, two factors involving development risk may mitigate against such a
licensor preference. First, if the licensor's compensation is based primarily
upon royalty payments and successful development is uncertain, then the
licensor will favor nonexclusive agreements in order to maximize the
probability that at least one development effort will be successful. For
example, if a single developer's probability of success is modest, then the total
expected profits available from multiple nonexclusive licenses may exceed the
expected profits from a single exclusive license. Second, the licensee's
relative unwillingness to make noncontingent (e.g., lump sum) payments
reduces the upper limit of overall payments (royalty and lump sum) that the
licensee would be willing to offer to obtain exclusivity. For example, if
royalty rates for nonexclusive licenses are already at the monopoly level, the
premium a licensee would pay for exclusivity would have to be channeled
through lump sum payments, which exposes the licensees to additional risk
08
that they may be reluctant to accept.
If one assumes that developers want exclusive rights and that licensors are
willing to award such contracts, the question becomes not whether the license
is negotiated as an exclusive but rather which licensee receives the exclusive
rights. Given the uncertainty attendant to such R&D efforts, the licensor
would likely choose (assuming the same royalty) the licensee with the highest
likelihood of success.
When multiple essential technologies are implicated, exclusivity can
introduce additional negotiation frictions if licensors differ in their assessments

107

Because each licensee is differentiated, competition between the licensees will not bid

away all of their profits.
1os Comparatively large lump sum payments appear to be uncommon in practice, perhaps
because licensees are unwilling to make large certain payments for even large uncertain
outcomes. See supra note 101. There is greater scope for increasing royalties when the
licensees have market power which counters at least some of the market power of the
monopoly licensors. One would expect to see more exclusive contracts in such situations.
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regarding the merits of the prospective licensees. To illustrate this dynamic
within the context of individual licensing, consider a simplified version of the
complements scenario: A and B are both essential parties and there is no
additional party C. Prospective licensees X and Y each want exclusive rights to
at least one of the two technologies and, at a minimum, nonexclusive rights to
the other technology. Consequently, a coordination issue arises that does not
exist with nonexclusive licensing. Licensors negotiating exclusive licenses
will try to identify the licensee most likely to develop the technology
successfully. If the licensors differ in their assessments regarding the buyers'
relative abilities, each licensee could acquire an exclusive license to a different
complement (recreating the underlying blocking situation). Moreover, a
licensor's assessment regarding the licensee's capabilities may vary over time
as additional information is acquired. If X licensed A exclusively and Y
licensed B exclusively, then various contingency provisions may be triggered
or a round of sublicensing may ensue. Such a negotiation thicket has the
potential to delay significantly the consummation of the licenses necessary for
vaccine development. The possibility of delay increases if the two prospective
licensees each want exclusive rights to both of the essential inputs. Controlling
more than one essential patent provides insurance against the possibility that a
patent thought "essential" was actually not essential, either because a substitute
for it is subsequently uncovered or because a rival manages to invent around
the single blocking patent.
Patent pools can theoretically reduce transaction costs because each
individual licensee would not have to negotiate to acquire exclusive licenses.
A closely related advantage of pooling is that participants can share
information and force an internal decision as to which exclusive buyer to
endorse, thus reducing some of the negotiational breakdown and coordination
problems that can plague independent licensing. This is not to argue that the
pool is always more efficient, of course, as the pool has its own formation and
internal governance issues. However, it seems quite plausible that the
individual licensing coordination problem grows faster than the pool
formation/governance problem as the number of essential patents increases and
that this problem could prove an obstacle to society's desire to act quickly.
The forgoing discussion assumed that each licensor sought only to
maximize its direct profits from an exclusive license deal. In many industries,
including the vaccine industry, one or more licensors may also be potential
licensees. In such cases a vertically integrated licensor who holds an essential
patent can legally block any potential licensee from successful development.
In theory, if that licensor sought only to maximize profits, it would still award
exclusivity to the most efficient potential licensee. But there will be cases in

109Sole ownership does, however, offer a potential pricing efficiency that renders it
attractive for profit and social welfare reasons. That efficiency derives from avoiding the
double-monopolization problem under fixed proportions that would emerge with
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which the vertically integrated firm instead uses its blocking power to help
establish itself as the exclusive developer, perhaps to avoid shutting down
Such
otherwise underutilized facilities or laying off excess staff.
considerations have the potential to further complicate negotiations and
increase transaction costs. It is unclear whether such costs would be higher for
individual licensing or for pooling.
The analysis in the previous sections of this Article regarding the relative
transaction costs and price efficiency associated with individual licensing and
pools also holds under exclusivity. However, because exclusivity further
increases the interrelatedness among license negotiations, it is likely to
increase the negotiational transaction costs for individual licensing faster than
it increases the joint pool negotiation costs. The interrelatedness costs are
exacerbated when the licensors prefer nonexclusive contracts while the
licensees prefer exclusive contracts, and when the licensors have different
assessments regarding which licensee is most likely to succeed in its
development efforts. While negotiational transaction costs associated with
exclusivity will vary greatly across licensing settings, and hence are unlikely to
always favor one licensing arrangement, in general the costs would appear to
be somewhat greater with individual licensing than with pools.
IV. RETOOLING POOLING
Industry standard-setting endeavors provide the most common
contemporary context in which patent pools are formed. This Article explores
the potential role for pools in industries characterized by very different patent
and competition landscapes. In particular, Part II described the key patent and
market features of the vaccine industry which is an exemplar of a very
different industry setting in which patent rights are frequently fragmented and
the market power associated with the patents is not created through joint
Given those industry
activities such as a standard-setting process.
characteristics, Part III applied basic economic theory to a series of
hypotheticals characterized by varying degrees of technological uncertainty in
order to illuminate the relative competitive pros and cons of pooling versus
individual licensing. This Part combines those practical and theoretical
insights to underscore the inadequacy of contemporary antitrust law and policy
to address contexts such as the vaccine industry. It identifies two areas
(substitutes and exclusivity) that warrant revisiting and offers general
recommendations with the goal of instigating and guiding further analysis.
This Part concludes by situating antitrust issues regarding patent pools within
the broader discourse between the patent and competition communities.

fragmented independent ownership of monopoly inputs and monopoly control of the enduser market.
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An Assessment of Individual Licensing Versus Pooling
Part III explored how individual licensing and patent pooling differ in the
degree to which they efficiently address the problem of fragmented property
rights. The relative effectiveness of each form of licensing depends on at least
two key factors: the extent to which each approach incurs significant
transaction costs and how well each fares in terms of pricing efficiency.
Performance on these dimensions is highly fact-specific. Nonetheless, several
observations regarding their relative merits are possible.
In many settings, such as patent licensing associated with a technological
standard, pooled licensing is preferable to individual licensing owing to the
sheer volume of licenses to be negotiated. Such is not likely to be the case
with vaccine development, for example, because the transaction costs at issue
relate primarily to the complexity of the negotiations and the effect of that
complexity in slowing time sensitive R&D. Complexity increases when the
technological relationships among the various patents relevant to the R&D at
issue are uncertain, appropriate and desired pricing is interrelated across the
technologies to be licensed, and exclusivity is highly coveted. Interrelatedness
considerations become more important at an increasing rate as the number of
technologies to be licensed increases. Further, transaction costs considerations
become increasingly significant as the premium for delay increases. Thus, the
one-stop characteristic of pools relative to individual licensing gives pools a
potentially significant advantage for dealing with such transactional
complexities. This advantage may be offset, however, if pool formation and
maintenance costs are significant or the absolute level of the transaction costs
that complexity introduces is not particularly significant. In the vaccine
development setting, technological uncertainty is commonplace, urgency is
great, and pricing is frequently interrelated. In this setting, therefore,
transaction costs are likely an important factor in determining the relative
attractiveness of individual licensing even assuming a relatively small number
of licenses.
The pricing efficiency of pools is likely to be welfare superior to individual
licensing when the conditions favoring pool selection of the single monopoly
price are present and the sum of the individual licensing prices exceeds this
single monopoly price. This comparative advantage increases as the gap
between these two widens. The combined individual licensing price can
greatly exceed the single monopoly price when licensees require access to
multiple essential patents. A key value of patent pools, then, is the pool's
ability and incentive to set a more efficient combined price than would emerge
from individual licensing. As discussed in Part III, by internalizing the profit
incentives of the individual pool members, pricing is more socially efficient
(e.g., the pool sets a combined license at the single monopoly price) while, at
the same time, more profitable. These advantages do not accrue, however, in
the absence of a clearly essential patent. If a pool did not include an essential
patent but did include some substitute technologies, the pool becomes, in part,
a mechanism to give such potential substitute technologies market power,
A.
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possibly resulting in a higher pool price relative to the sum of the individual
licensing prices. Furthermore, the price benefits to efficient pricing through
the pool diminish as the dominant source of payment shifts from royalty
payments to lump sum fees.
In light of these dynamics, the relative price efficiency of pooling vis-A-vis
individual licensing hinges, in large part, upon the existence of an essential
patent input (or at least the very strong likelihood that at least one of a group of
pooled technologies will ultimately be found to be essential) and the use of
royalties as the primary source of license payments. Moreover, as the number
of essential patents increases, the number of complements and the pricing
advantage of the pool over individual licensing should also increase. Finally,
the pure form of the single monopoly price argument assumes no licensee
market power to offset the market power that many of the individual licensors
may enjoy. As licensee market power increases, the sum of the individual
license prices also decreases, rendering the pool less attractive for society. 0
Given this general characterization of the relative pros and cons of pooling
versus individual licensing in the vaccine setting at issue, the next Section
offers some recommendations for improving antitrust law and the competition
discourse regarding patent pools.
B.

Technological Relationships- Possible Substitutes

Discerning the technological relationship between patents and identifying
whether any are essential may be extremely difficult, particularly when the
technology is in its early stages and further R&D is required. Willard Tom,
former counsel to the SARS patent pool, observed that because some vaccine
manufacturers may utilize only a portion of the viral genome while others may
utilize the entire sequence, a single determination of complementarity or
substitutability regarding any associated patents may not be possible." That
sentiment has been echoed within the context of biomedical research more
broadly: it may be that "where patent pools would be of most interest, final
products have yet to be developed. But when final products do not yet exist it
may be ipso facto especially difficult to determine which patents are
essential.""l 2 This difficulty of characterizing the underlying technological
relationships may be compounded if the options available are overly simplistic
ones such as complements, substitutes, or neither.

1o The analysis of market power on both sides of the market is complex and would also
involve distinguishing how much additional market power a pool might have compared with
the market power that already may exist with each individual licensor. For example, if the
pool does not enhance the market power that already existed, it is not clear that the pricing
via a pool would result in a higher combined license price than under individual licensing
even when the pool price falls below the single monopoly price.
"' Tom, supra note 69, at 28-29.
112 Gauld, supra note 69, at 9.
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The extent to which patent pools play a meaningful role in facilitating R&D,
given fragmented intellectual property, will reflect to some extent the manner
Unfortunately,
in which antitrust handles technological uncertainty.
contemporary antitrust law and policy has been formulated largely upon the
assumption (stemming from the standard-setting context) that technological
relationships can be identified with virtual certainty and that only essential
patents (complements without substitutes) can be included within a pool. The
particularly prominent role of the antitrust agencies' policy pronouncements
regarding pooling has contributed to this skewed perspective. This Section
advocates an antitrust analysis incorporating the more nuanced tradeoffs,
including the recognition of possible substitutes, required in circumstances
such as those characterizing the vaccine industry.
Legal and Policy Pronouncements Regarding Possible Substitutes and
Pools
Patent pools that contain substitute technologies pose the risk, in the
extreme, of merely providing a mechanism for naked price fixing. A
preoccupation with such collusion is readily apparent in the key agency
pronouncements regarding patent pooling. Owing to the factual context
(standard-setting) and practical context (policy statements and advisory
opinions) to which that guidance has been primarily directed, the resulting
guidance is incomplete. Additionally, the relative dearth of case law on this
issue has contributed to the arguably excessive profile of these policy
Fortunately, the antitrust regime is well-equipped to
pronouncements.
transcend its current shortcomings by applying the more nuanced competitive
effects analysis that it routinely applies within other contexts.
The FTC and DOJ's joint guidelines, Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property ("IP Guidelines"), address numerous issues involving
antitrust and intellectual property including those arising from patent pools. 13
Although such statements of enforcement policy do not formally bind either
the agencies themselves or the courts, their influence, particularly in the
absence of case law, can be considerable.' 14 The IP Guidelines emphasize that
the procompetitive benefits attendant to pooling derive from "integrating
complementary technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing blocking
positions, and avoiding costly infringement litigation."s15 The language of the
guideline provision itself is somewhat open-ended in that the inclusion of
1.

1

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE

27-30 (Apr. 6, 2005) [hereinafter IP GUIDELINES],
availableat http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf.
" See generally Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger
Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 771 (2006) (chronicling the
adoption of "non-binding" agency guidelines and analyzing the use and effect of those
guidelines on the evolution of antitrust merger law).
" IP GUIDELINES, supra note 113, at 28.
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
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substitutes within a pool is not expressly prohibited. Nonetheless, it is worth
noting that two examples which illustrate the relevant guideline are somewhat
extreme. Example 9 in the IP Guidelines illustrates an anticompetitive joint
assignment of patent rights, similar for instant purposes to a patent pool, which
are close substitutes." 6 Example 10 illustrates a procompetitive patent pool in
which the patents contributed are not only complementary but also blocking.' 1 7
In addition to general enforcement policy statements, the U.S. federal
antitrust agencies each provide an important mechanism which enables private
parties to receive an advisory opinion with regard to enforcement intentions.
For the Antitrust Division within the Department of Justice that guidance takes
the form of Business Review Letters." 8 Much of the current antitrust guidance
on patent pools derives from a series of such letters involving standard-setting
organizations.1 9 These letters evaluate the potential procompetitive and
anticompetitive effects of the proposed pools in much the same manner as the
IP Guidelines delineate. Unlike the Guidelines which are extremely general,
DOJ's business review letters address specific factual circumstances. The
letters at issue explicitly recognize that each proposed pool will "exclude
substitute technologies ... by admitting to the pool only those complementary
patents essential to manufacture products complying with the standard." 20
Two characteristics of the business review letters are particularly relevant. The
first is merely a reflection of the administrative context in which the guidance
is offered. If an antitrust agency is willing to state that it would not institute an
antitrust action, there is a strong bias that the practices evaluated in this manner

Id. at 25.
Id. at 29-30.
"' See 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (2009) (delineating the procedure for requesting a business
review letter from the Departmentof Justice).
119 The relevant letters are: Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Division, IEEE, Business Review
Letter (Apr. 30, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/222978.pdf; Dep't of
Justice, Antitrust Division, VITA, Business Review Letter (Oct. 30, 2006),
Dep't of Justice, Antitrust
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/219380.htm;
Division, 3G Patent Platform Partnership, Business Review Letter (Nov. 12, 2002),
Dep't of Justice, Antitrust
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/200455.pdf;
Division, Hitachi, Ltd., Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., et al., Business Review
Letter (June 10, 1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.pdf;
Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Division, Koninklijke Philips Electronics,N.V., Sony Corporation
of Japan and Pioneer Electronic Corporationof Japan, Business Review Letter (Dec. 16,
1998), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.pdf; Dep't of Justice,
Antitrust Division, MPEG LA, L.L.C., et al., Business Review Letter (June 26, 1997),
availableat http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/215742.pdf.
120 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 71 & n.91
(2007) [hereinafter DOJ/FTC REPORT] (identifying the relevant portions of the letters supra
note 119: MPEG-2 Business Review Letter at 10-11; 3C DVD Business Review Letter at
10-13; 6C DVD Business Review Letter at 12-13; 3G Business Review Letter at 10).
116
"o
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will tend strongly towards the unambiguously permissible. 12 1 The second is
the factual context, standard-setting, which they directly address.
Although the business review letters do not directly state that DOJ will
challenge pools that include possible substitutes, 122 the absence of any letters
nominally sanctioning pools with possible substitutes provides at least indirect
evidence, potentially sufficient to have a chilling effect, that such pools raise
competitive concerns. This is particularly true given that it is both common
knowledge and common practice that business review letter requests likely to
result in a DOJ challenge are withdrawn.123
While the antitrust agencies have long recognized that the rule of reason
applies to patent pools, recently they have abstractly acknowledged the
prospect that this may include countenancing inclusion of possible substitutes
within a pool.124 At the same time, these pronouncements regarding pools
within the standard-setting contexts do not identify any concrete instances in
which the inclusion of possible substitutes was permitted, thereby likely
leaving potential pool participants wondering if the agencies' current
appreciation for the net benefits of allowing possible substitutes into a pool
remains at a more theoretical level. 125
At a minimum, formal agency guidance on the issue of substitutes suggests
that a pool that may include substitutes is subject to a substantial and
potentially chilling prosecutorial risk. Princo Corp. v. International Trade
121 "Parties desiring a favorable business review often incorporate mechanisms designed
to eliminate or minimize risk of anticompetitive effects in order to give the Department
sufficient confidence in its assessment of the likely competitive effects of the proposed
activity to permit the issuance of a favorable letter." DOJ/FTC REPORT, supra note 120, at
72. If an enforcement investigation is launched into an operating pool, "the failure to
incorporate all the safeguards set forth in the pooling business review letters will not
automatically lead to the conclusion that the pool is anticompetitive." Id. The agencies will
evaluate whether the "actual conduct has an anticompetitive effect." Id. at 72-73.
122 The antitrust agencies have consistently avoided condemning patent pools that
include substitutes as being per se illegal (in the absence of an overt price-fixing scheme).
See id. at 10. Thus,
[The antitrust agencies] will continue to evaluate the competitive effects of cross
licenses and patent pools under the framework of the Antitrust and IP Guidelines.
Given the cognizable benefits and potential anticompetitive effects associated with
both of these licensing practices, the Agencies typically will analyze both types of
agreements under the rule of reason.
Id. at 9.
123 James A. Keyte, The Risks and Rewards of Business Review Letters, 12 ANTITRUST 28
(1998). Business letter requesting parties may withdraw their letter requests or modify their
proposed conduct in response to DOJ feedback. These options may explain why ninety-five
percent of business review letters between 1994 and 1997 were letters indicating no intentto-challenge the conduct at issue. Id.
124 See, e.g., Frances Marshall, Patent Pools: Perspectives on Enforcement, 867 PLI/PAT
367, 379-80 (2006); DOJ/FTC REPORT, supra note 120, at 76-78.
125 DOJIFTC REPORT, supra note 120, at 76-78.
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Commission provides some salutary guidance. 126 In Princo, the Federal
Circuit addressed the antitrust implications of pooling non-essential patents.
The "central issue" was "whether Princo's admitted infringement of Philips's
patents [was] subject to a patent misuse defense." 27 Princo proffered a misuse
defense arguing that the patents it infringed were included in a pool despite the
fact that they were not essential to the pooled technology. 128 The
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found that the pooled patents covered
technology for which "a non-infringing, 'economically viable[] alternative
technology existed.'129 The ALJ then ruled that the "tying arrangement
constituted misuse." 30 The U.S. International Trade Commission ("ITC")
adopted the ALJ ruling. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit then reversed.
The Federal Circuit stated that the procompetitive efficiencies associated
with patent pools "are not limited to situations in which a potential pool patent
is, in fact, a blocking patent."' 3' Extending this line of reasoning, the court
further opined that, "[p]rohibiting the inclusion in a package license of a patent
that is arguably essential, merely because it ultimately proved not to be
essential would undercut, even eliminate, this potential procompetitive
efficiency." 32 The court further wrote:
We [the Federal Circuit] thus think that perfect certainty is not required to
avoid a charge of misuse through unlawful tying. Rather, in this context a
blocking patent is one that at the time of the license an objective
manufacturer would believe reasonably might be necessary to practice the
technology at issue.133
The Federal Circuit has, however, withdrawn this opinion pending rehearing
en banc.134 The facts of Princo are potentially instructive regarding how the
126 Princo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 563 F.3d 1301, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2009), reh'g en
banc granted 583 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

127Id. at 1303. Patent misuse is a defense often raised, as within Princo, in the context
of an infringement action. For instant purposes, a misuse defense is "tantamount to a

defense" that the patent's owner used the patent in an anticompetitive manner. HERBERT
§
5.5b (3d ed. 2005). Misuse has been found even in the absence of an antitrust violation.
Nonetheless, the misuse and antitrust inquiries are often closely allied as they are within the
context of tying. A successful misuse defense typically results in the patent being held
unenforceable. Id.
128 Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1304.
129 Id.
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE

130 Id.
131 Id. at 1310.
132 Id.

Id.
134 Princo Corp. v. ITC, 583 F.3d 1380, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (granting rehearing en
banc and vacating panel opinion).
133
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court will consider licensing under the dual conditions of urgency and
uncertainty which characterize settings such as vaccine development. Though
it is unclear whether the facts are likely to generate a legal ruling that either
clarifies the standard and the definition of substitute or that suggests specific
protocols regarding pool formation and operation that could help navigate the
underlying tension between procompetitive efficiencies and anticompetitive
harms.
2. Recommendations Regarding Possible Substitutes
Patent pools receive rule of reason analysis under the antitrust laws.135
However, the practical consequences of applying that legal standard to pools
such as those at issue herein are highly ambiguous. The antitrust agencies,
through a combination of enforcement guidelines and business review letters,
have largely dominated the discourse regarding the potential antitrust
consequences of pooling substitute technologies. To the extent that the
agencies' standard setting-derived aversion to pooling substitutes is actually
imported or viewed as directly applicable to the industry contexts this Article
addresses, efficiencies may be unduly sacrificed and, as a result, consumer
welfare harmed. Towards that end, this Section advocates a more nuanced
antitrust analysis which transcends the frequently unrealistic assumption of
clearly known technological relationships and proposes a starting point for
engaging in the balancing that is the hallmark of the rule of reason.
This Article advocates modestly relaxing the de facto standard regarding
that,
pooling to permit inclusion of what are likely essential patents
nonetheless, have a significant possibility of having substitutes (hereinafter,
"possible substitutes"). This proposal is designed to capture the benefits while
reducing the potential costs of pooling such technologies. In particular, the
burden of proof for inclusion in the pool is sufficiently permissive to
accommodate pool formation despite the technological uncertainty that
frequently characterizes the early stages of R&D. The proposal addresses
three related requirements regarding the inclusion of ostensibly essential
patents (i.e., patents that are unique and required) within a given pool by
establishing a tiered-threshold for the level of certainty regarding the fact of
essentiality for patents that are candidates for being pooled and a mechanism
for removing non-unique or unnecessary patents from a pool.
The proposal's first requirement is the inclusion of at least one patent for
which essentiality is reasonably certain. The second requirement is that all
135See supra note 122 (discussing the rule of reason).

See Gaul6, supra note 69, at 9 (recognizing both the challenges that the essentiality
standard poses for biotechnology-related pools and the fact that it is "less clear [] whether
competition authorities would be ready to accept patent pools that include patents meeting a
weaker definition of complementary than essentiality or where essentiality is likely but
difficult to prove"); Tom, supra note 69, at 29 (advocates in general terms "adjust[ing]" the
essentiality standard within the biotechnology context).
136
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other pooled patents must be substantially more likely than not essential.13 7
The third requirement, given that these thresholds could result in the inclusion
of non-essential patents, is an eviction procedure for patents that no longer
meet the thresholds established for inclusion. Note that just as inclusion into
the pool does not require complete certainty regarding essentiality, so too
eviction from the pool does not require complete certainty regarding nonessentiality. After an eviction occurs, each licensee has the option to maintain
the previous pool license including continued access to the evicted patents on
the previously negotiated terms. Alternatively, each licensee can unilaterally
terminate the existing contract and presumably negotiate new licensing
agreements with all concerned. In the absence of any ostensibly essential
patents, dissolution of the pool is warranted.
The determination of whether a patent meets the various standards will be
made by an independent expert who will screen patents regarding inclusion in
the pool and who will monitor the changing scientific and technological
relationships among pool technologies to each other and to technologies
outside the pool. 38 Such patent monitoring is commonplace among modern
standards pools. The contributors to the pool are assumed to anticipate the
transaction costs associated with pool formation and maintenance including
patent screening, monitoring, eviction, and renegotiation. If the pool formation
and maintenance involved transaction costs that more than offset the price
efficiency benefits, the individual parties would not be expected to form the
pool.
The importance of including at least one essential patent in a pool is the
insurance it provides that even if the pool also contained substitutes, it would
not set a price greater than that which would obtain from individualized
licensing. Recall that if an essential patent were the only required input, it
could obtain a monopoly price and if other patents are also essential or are
partial substitutes, the combined total price to a licensee under individual
licensing would likely exceed the monopoly price. But when the various
137 These general requirements warrant liberal interpretation so that their intended goal,
the inclusion of at least one essential patent, could be applied meaningfully across a wide
range of fact patterns. For example, assume two technologies satisfy the second criterion
("substantially more likely than not essential"), but neither of them satisfies the first
criterion ("essentiality is reasonably certain"). Additionally, one of the two technologies is
essential but it is not known which one. Formation of such a pool should be permissible
even though it fails to meet the literal requirements of the proposal.
138 Many of the patents that the independent expert classifies as substitutes will not be
"plug-in" substitutes in that they may not be interchangeable ex post once the vaccine
development path has been chosen. The patent eviction process delineated is less effective
in dealing with patents originally admitted into the pool that are of this type because
previous licensees may have already been locked into a vaccine based on one of the (ex ante
but not ex post) substitutes. Such licensees would, however, still benefit from the pool's
incentives to set a single monopoly price (which would typically be lower than what the
licensee would have obtained in individual market negotiations).
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inputs are pooled, the pool (under a specific set of conditions that is likely met
in the vaccine settings) will maximize profits if it charges a single monopoly
price for the entire set of patents. Hence, the prospect of potential substitutes
to price fix via a pool should be relatively less concerning as overall prices will
be lower.
The foregoing argument regarding the monopoly pricing suggests that the
inclusion of substitutes within a pool is not problematic if at least one essential
patent is also included. Given the ostensible lack of harm attendant to pooling
substitutes, why incorporate an eviction procedure? The eviction option serves
to mitigate the costs attendant to pooling when the conditions for a single
monopoly price do not all hold (the combined royalties exceed the single
monopoly price), or when sufficient licensee power exists to force total prices,
even with an essential patent, below monopoly levels.139 This proposal's
approach is consistent with that expressed in the now rescinded Princo ruling
that pool legality should be based on ex ante assessments of essentiality. This
proposal not only delineates the contours for such pre-pooling determinations,
but also requires ongoing reassessments over the life of the pool.
What does "eviction" mean as a practical matter? Clearly, after removal of
a patent, the pool would not offer new licenses under the previous terms.
Instead, the pool would renegotiate terms with the remaining patent holders for
a new pool license including a new profit division going forward. Existing
licensees, however, could choose between continuing with the previous pool
license and terminating that license during a prescribed time frame (for
example, three months). The value of this option to the licensee lies in its
ability to provide both security and flexibility. With regard to the former, the
ability of licensees to continue under the existing contracts guarantees that
regardless of how the technological uncertainty is resolved, the licensees could
fare no worse than the terms they had already accepted. Consequently, the
licensees need not fear, at the extreme, being shut out of the market because
they no longer have a necessary license. Nonetheless, the licensees' ability to
terminate the pool license may translate into potentially significant latitude for
renegotiation. Because the evicted patent has a previously unrecognized
substitute, the profits that the substitute patent(s) can subsequently earn in the
market should be less than those the now evicted patent previously earned as
part of the pool. The remaining pooled patents are now less constrained and
may be able to earn more profits via their larger share of the new pool profits,
but that can occur only if the new pool is able to renegotiate a new license with
previous licensees. Those licensees, in turn, will agree only if the total price

"I The single monopoly price argument taken to its logical extreme actually suggests
that keeping substitute patents in the pool would result in a more efficient price if the
substitute patents retain some level of differentiation or, equivalently, would be expected to
be licensed at an oligopoly price in independent market negotiations. Willard Tom has
argued that eviction has no negative consequences. See Tom, supra note 69. This would be
true if competition among the evicted substitutes is extremely intense.
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for the required patents is less than under the old pool license. A lower price
for the evicted patents or their substitutes should be a force acting to lower
end-user prices.
As an example of how the proposal would apply, consider the following
scenario: Six patents (A, B, C, D, E, and F) are possible candidates for
inclusion within a pool. An independent expert determines that D and E are
substitutes and excludes them. F is found to be unnecessary and is also
excluded. The expert also finds that it is almost certain that A is essential and
that B and C seem considerably more likely than not to be essential. Thus, a
clear recognition exists that B and C have a modest possibility of being
substitutes or of not being necessary at all. Given those facts, the ability of a
pool including A, B, and C to pass muster under the prevailing antitrust law
and policy norms is highly suspect at best. Under this Article's proposal,
however, A, B, and C can participate in a patent pool.
Assume the pool license price is $10 and A receives $6 while B and C each
receive $2. Suppose vaccine developer Z takes a license. As the vaccine R&D
progresses, the technological relationships among the pooled technologies
become clearer and the independent expert determines that a new technology G
is a substitute for C.140 Patent C is evicted from the pool. Developer Z can
either continue with its existing pool license or renegotiate licenses with A, B,
and either C or G. Because C and G are substitutes, the individual license
price for either of them is likely to be less than $2. Suppose that price is $1. If
developer Z can license C for $1, it should be able to negotiate new licenses for
A and B via the pool at a price that is less than $9. Ts total license price,
therefore, would be less than the original pool license price of $10 but greater
than $8. Additionally, both A and B would receive greater profit than under
the original license.
3. Concerns Regarding Failed Pool Negotiations
One critical transaction cost associated with patent pooling not yet discussed
is the competitive risk associated with failed efforts to pool. If firms owning
possible substitutes (e.g., B and C in the prior hypothetical) discuss pricing and
profit division during pool negotiations and the negotiations fail, then the
potential exists for such discussions to facilitate subsequent tacit price

140 Alternatively, if patent C is found to be unnecessary and of no incremental value, C
will be unable to command any royalty after it is evicted. The remaining pool members and
the licensee can renegotiate such that all improve their positions relative to profit earned
under the original pool license. A more difficult case arises when a patent originally
included in the pool is found to be unnecessary but it offers incremental value over the other
patents in the pool. The licensee can choose between licensing only the core essential
patents and licensing the core patents plus the discretionary patent. Consideration of this
further complication is beyond this Article's scope.
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coordination 4'1 resulting in higher individual licensing prices.142 Whether or
what kind of competitive threat failed pooling efforts introduce reflects
numerous factors. Two key factors are whether the market at issue is
conducive to tacit collusion and, even if it is, whether pooling negotiations
were conducted in a manner that mitigates or exacerbates any underlying
competitive risk. The lack of recognition this issue has received by the courts,
agencies and commentators is likely a function of the current legal regime's
strong discouragement of price negotiations during pool formation.
An outright prohibition on price negotiations would, of course, diffuse the
competitive threat unsuccessful pool formation may pose. Such prohibitions
would also, however, severely undermine the prospects that the type of pools
this Article addresses would form at all. When patents relevant to a pool vary
considerably regarding essentiality and value, they would likely command
differing royalty rates if individually licensed. Essential patents would
command higher royalties than those that may have substitutes. Consequently,
as a condition to pool participation, the essential patent holders, in particular,
would require assurances that they would receive royalties at least equal to
what they could otherwise obtain through individual licensing. In the absence
of at least some preliminary price and/or profit division negotiations, those
holding the most valuable patents will find pool participation to be particularly
risky.
The significance of easing prohibitions on price discussions varies
depending upon the context. As the likelihood that two patents included in the
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "contracts, combinations, or conspiracies" in
restraint of trade. "In determining whether such an agreement exists, courts have relied
heavily on common law contract formulations, such as 'meeting of the minds' or 'mutual
assent."' HOVENKAMP, supra note 127, § 4.2. Tacit coordination or tacit collusion refers to
Id. § 4.4a. Such behavior is concerted
"oligopolistic, interdependent behavior."
anticompetitive conduct for which "there is no direct evidence that it resulted from explicit
agreement among competitors." Id. § 4.2. It has long been recognized that "firms in
concentrated markets can increase their prices above the competitive level without . . . the
need for anything resembling a 'conspiracy' or agreement among the parties." Id.
142 In the standard-setting pool context, specific pricing discussion is not undertaken
prior to pool formation owing to the concern it will be condemned as price fixing. See, e.g.,
John J. Kelly & Daniel I. Prywes, A Safety Zone for the Ex Ante Communication of
Licensing Terms at Standard-SettingOrganizations,ANTITRUST SOURCE, Mar. 2006, at 1, 12. The type of patent pool this Article addresses is materially different from a standardsetting pool because even in independent negotiations, there is already "monopoly" market
power that accrues to each of the essential patent holders - market power is not created as a
result of the actions of the pool (e.g., to set a standard requiring use of some of the patented
technologies held by pool members). Hence, price discussions are less troubling and are
likely necessary to secure participation. However, even in the standard-setting context,
some commentators have argued that potential pool members should be given more latitude
to discuss pricing. Id. at II ("Unless appropriate safety zones [regarding ex ante pricing
discussion for patent pools] are developed and approved, the antitrust laws may perversely
become an impediment to efficiency and consumer welfare.").
141
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prospective pool are substitutes decreases, the price effect of tacit coordination
also decreases. For pure complements there should be no collusion issue. By
restricting pool participation to essential patents for which a substitute is
unlikely, the proposal limits the potential competitive hazard. Additionally,
owners of essential patents offer some protection against tacit coordination.
Essential patent holders have monopoly-like market power and prefer that
other patent holders do not engage in tacit coordination to raise price because,
if they do, the Cournot-complements pricing dynamic suggests that these
essential patent owners would be worse off.' 4 Then, anticipating a possible
failure in negotiations, essential patent holders may choose not to negotiate
exactly in industry settings where failed negotiations are believed to facilitate
tacit collusion among the possible substitute patent holders. Finally, within the
industry context this Article addresses, tacit coordination may be quite difficult
because market transactions involve non-public prices and possibly large sale
quantities, both of which are factors that greatly encourage cheating on any
tacit or explicit agreement. 1 "
These considerations notwithstanding, if failed pool negotiations pose a risk
of increased individual license pricing, it is useful to consider whether the
value of reductions of competitive risk through restrictions on pool
negotiations (short of completely prohibiting price discussions) outweigh the
Pool
additional costs or inefficiencies created by those restrictions.
negotiations could be conducted between a disinterested third party
administrator and each prospective pool participant. This administrator would
work with the independent expert to first address technology questions that
determine which patents would be permissible to include in the prospective
pool. Then, once it is established what technological relationships likely exist,
the administrator would be the primary agent for division of profits and price
negotiations. Individual patent holders would have no contact with each other,
so the negotiations should do little or nothing to facilitate collusion should the
pool fail to form.
A particularly dangerous situation regarding failed pool negotiations arises
when pool and individual license negotiations occur simultaneously. Although
a third-party administrator could mitigate the competitive risk in this situation,
additional safeguards could be taken such as requiring parties involved with
ongoing pool negotiations to suspend individual license negotiations.
Alternatively, one could require the potential pool participants to fully
segregate those negotiating the pool itself from those negotiating individual
licenses.
A strong prohibition on price-related discussions during pool formation has
come under increasing criticism within the standard-setting context where it is
See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 91.
'44 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 2.12 (Apr. 2, 1992, rev'd Apr. 8, 1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf
143
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viewed as potentially counterproductive to the emergence of procompetitive
pools. Historically, standards-related pools have avoided any price-related
information exchange other than to require a general RAND (reasonable and
nondiscriminatory) commitment by the owners of patents incorporated into the
standard.14 5 RAND, or FRAND (fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory)
commitments require patent holders of technologies essential to
implementation of a given standard to establish fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms if a standard incorporating their patent is established.146
The purpose of such commitments is to avoid "unexpected hold-up by patent
Owing to the self-evident imprecision of such RAND
owners."l4 7
commitments, however, standard development organizations argue that they
are vulnerable to patent holders who, despite a RAND obligation, then demand
royalties that are "significantly higher than expected" and that may render the
standard "commercially infeasible."l14 8
In 2006, the standards development organization VITA sought DOJ's
assessment, through the business review letter process, of a proposed policy
which would require that patent holders seeking consideration for inclusion
within a standard under development "must declare the maximum royalty rates
and most restrictive non-royalty terms that the [patent holder] will request for
any such patent claims that are essential to implement the eventual
standard."4 DOJ effectively approved this policy through its conclusion that
it has "no present intention to take antitrust enforcement action against the
conduct . . . described."150 As discussed, the standard-setting context differs
significantly from the setting this Article addresses. Additionally, the VITA
proposal differs significantly from the price and profit division discussions at
issue herein which, for example, generally requires specific royalty divisions.
Nonetheless, it constitutes an important recognition that price and information
sharing restrictions can profoundly and potentially adversely affect the value of
pooling.
The antitrust risk that failed negotiations pose would seem particularly
salient in the settings this Article addresses because price and profit allocation
issues would likely be central to whether a pool would form at all. Despite
strong indicators that tacit price coordination is very difficult in such markets,
it is perhaps prudent to not be overly aggressive by permitting inclusion into a
pool those patents which fail the substantially more likely to be essential
test. ' A conservative approach, vis-A-vis antitrust, would favor barring from
the pool patents that are very likely to be essential but are possibly substitutes.
145 See supra note 142.

146VITA Business Review Letter, supra note 119, at 4.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 3.
149 Id. at 4.
'" Id. at 10.
151See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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Such an approach would sacrifice some of the price and transactional
efficiencies that pools offer. For example, the greater the number of essential
patents remaining outside the pool, the lower the social efficiency gains from
pool pricing. This Article recommends requiring a strong showing that pooled
patents do not have substitutes.152 Price discussions among complementary
patent holders do not pose nearly as troubling an antitrust concern and, at least
until society gains experience with pool formation dynamics, a cautious
approach seems warranted.
C.

OwnershipRelationships - Exclusivity

Section B explored how the ability of patent pools to facilitate R&D reflects,
in part, antitrust treatment of uncertain technological relationships. Along
similar lines, this Section explores how antitrust's treatment of exclusive
licensing by patent pools could profoundly influence the development of
efficiency enhancing pools.
Antitrust accepts as a given the exclusivity, and with it the potential for
market power, attendant to legitimately conferred patents. As a result,
individual patent holders are afforded wide latitude regarding unilateral
disposition of their intellectual property rights via exclusive licensing. When
two or more patents are aggregated, either through a series of exclusive
individual licenses or through a pool with exclusive licensing rights, additional
antitrust issues may arise. The relevant case law and agency policy
pronouncements provide only high level guidance regarding the treatment of
exclusivity in the patent pools this Article addresses. Hence, some uncertainty
may exist regarding whether the courts and agencies will treat exclusivity the
same in pools as in a series of individual licenses.
1. Legal and Policy Pronouncements Regarding Exclusivity and Pools
Antitrust analyzes exclusive licenses under the rule of reason. As applied,
the rule of reason weighs the costs and benefits of allowing exclusivity in a
manner consistent with the "principles and standards used to analyze mergers,
particularly those in the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines."15 3 In the
absence of any horizontal relationships between the parties, a patent holder can
typically exclusively license another party because the agreement is viewed as
essentially shifting an existing exclusive right from one entity to another entity.
The underlying logic, as one commentator has observed, is that a patent
provides the "right to exclude" and the threat to competition that an exclusive
license poses is "no reater than the threat created by the exclusionary power
of the patent itself." 54 The exclusionary power attendant to the patents at
152 This

standard arguably is more stringent than the "reasonably might be necessary"
standard articulated in the subsequently withdrawn Princo ruling. The Princo court did not
consider, for obvious reasons, the anticompetitive risk associated with failed pooling efforts.
153 IP GUIDELINES, supra note 113, at 31.
154 Reisner, supra note 72,
at 97.
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issue will be enhanced most directly if the acquired patents are substitutes
rather than complements to the intellectual property the acquiring party already
controls or is seeking to acquire.
Established guidance exists regarding the potential competitive risk that the
aggregation of rights to substitute patents poses within both the individual
licensing and pooling contexts. 5 5 Recently, greater attention and concrete
guidance has emerged regarding a different potential competitive harm
associated with the aggregation of exclusive licenses to even complementary
technologies: the possible reduction in incentives to innovate. This guidance
arises largely within the context of standards-related patent pools. The DOJ
business review letters are uniform in their de facto approval of pools that all
explicitly provide for nonexclusive licensing in which the patent holders
expressly retain the right to license their respective patents independent of the
pool.15 6 The rationale underlying the antitrust agency's preference for
nonexclusive licensing into a pool reflects, in part, concern about ongoing
innovation. If the constituent patents for an industry standard are available for
license individually, the prospect of a competing standard emerging is greater
than if those constituent patents are unavailable for individual licensing.
Though not expressly addressed by the business review letters, nonexclusive
licensing out of the pool is assumed as standards-related pools seek to promote
adoption of the standard through making the licenses widely available to all
potential licensees.
The Agencies have opined on when the failure to establish nonexclusive
pool licenses may raise antitrust questions. "A competitive concern would
arise . . . if decisions on licensing outside a pool were part of a concerted

attempt by the pool's licensor's to hinder the ability of others (outside of the
pool) to offer a competitive product or process."1
And yet, the Agencies
have also recognized more generally that "[e]xclusive licenses may be
desirable, and thus potentially procompetitive if they are necessary to provide a
si nificant incentive for the licensees to invest in complementary assets. . .
. 58 The challenge for the courts when addressing exclusive licensing by
pools, as well as the serial acquisition of exclusive licenses by a single entity,
becomes how to accommodate these two potentially conflicting imperatives
within the context of rule of reason balancing. 5 9

15s See supra Part IV.B.1.
156 DOJ/FTC REPORT, supra note 120, at 79.
151Id. at 80.
118Id. at 79.

1 Settings in which pools only perform the licensing function are the easiest to analyze.
Here, exclusivity means that the pool has the exclusive right to license the patents
contributed to the pool. Non-exclusive licenses would represent the situation, for example,
where the original patent-holders maintain the right to license their patents individually.
Granting exclusive licensing rights to a pool does not imply that the pool will use this grant
to license a single licensee; but without an exclusive licensing right, a pool cannot
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As an example of an antitrust analysis involving a consolidation through a
series of exclusive license agreements, consider the hypothetical discussed
previously in which three essential patents, A, B, and C are owned by three
different firms. These patents are assumed to lack substitutes and are assumed
to be complementary as successful vaccine development ultimately requires all
three technologies. The absence of any horizontal relationships among the
underlying three patents suggests that their acquisition by a single entity would
not further increase the level of exclusion that already existed.
Now consider whether the antitrust analysis changes if the patent-holders (A,
B, C) exclusively licensed a patent pool. At least in theory, the same
procompetitive effects which support permitting a single party to acquire
exclusive rights to such a patent estate would also appear to justify an
exclusive license grant to a patent pool. It is unfortunate, however, that no
direct guidance presently exists regarding such patent pools. Moreover, all of
the legal and policy guidance on patent pools concerns standards-based pools
and that guidance appears to discourageexclusive licensing to pools. While it
is possible, and well-recognized, that the exclusive licensing of complementary
patents to a pool may reduce competition to innovate around those patents, the
same possible anticompetitive effect (though not comparably or adequately
acknowledged) also applies to consolidation through individual exclusive
licenses.
Given the stark differences between standards-oriented pools and the
vaccine-related pools at issue herein (e.g., market power created through the
standard and significant volume-based licensing savings), legal guidance
derived within the former context should not be merely imported into the latter
context. Nonetheless, the prospect of such unwarranted legal spill-over
requires attention. If the lessons from standards-oriented pools constitute the
baseline for analyzing pools (but not individual licensing), a relative bias could
be introduced against exclusivity in pools. Similarly, it is also possible that an
analysis of the incremental competitive effects associated with the serial
acquisition of multiple, individual exclusive licenses might differ from an
analysis of the simultaneous acquisition (i.e., patent pool) of the same
exclusive licenses.
2. Recommendations Regarding Exclusivity
At the highest level, rule of reason analysis is the applicable antitrust
standard whether one is analyzing exclusive licensing within the context of
patent pools (regardless of type) or the context of individual licensing.
However, implementation of that rule may vary between contexts and, as a
result, so too may the ultimate antitrust outcomes. The challenge, of course, is
unilaterally award a licensee an exclusive license. Whether an exclusive pool actually
decides to license exclusively or non-exclusively may be unknown at the time of pool
formation and may depend on the value that the potential licensees assign to exclusive
versus nonexclusive licenses.
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to ensure that nominally different outcomes reflect fidelity to the underlying
antitrust principles. Within the context of exclusivity, successful application of
a general standard like rule of reason balancing requires successfully
navigating the oftentimes critical distinctions between different types of pools
and recognizing important similarities between pools and the serial acquisition
of multiple, individual licenses. A simple clarification of how the law would,
or at least should, be applied specifically to the pools at issue would help in
this regard. This clarification would also reduce any misperceptions that may
exist in the practitioner community. Such misperceptions, if left unchecked,
could unnecessarily discourage the use of patent pools, encourage the use of
individual licensing even when pools are more efficient; and, in so doing,
could reduce innovation and consumer welfare.
If, in fact, unduly harsh antitrust treatment of exclusivity occurred regarding
the category of patent pools at issue herein, then it would potentially dissuade
pooling which enjoys efficiency benefits relative to a series of exclusive
individual licenses. For example, consider a situation in which value-added
development through a joint venture (pool) is superior to development by an
individual firm and exclusive in-licensing is necessary to incentivize
development (in either form). If exclusive in-licensing is only permitted in the
individual licensing case, a more efficient pool may be eschewed in favor of
the less efficient single-firm consolidation. Furthermore, because a restriction
against exclusive in-licensing by definition implies a restriction against
exclusive out-licensing, there are also potential efficiencies that could be lost if
exclusive licensing to buyers is prohibited. Transaction costs attendant to the
pursuit of exclusivity might be lower with pools relative to individual
licensing. As discussed previously, exclusivity increases the complexity of
individual licensing either by increasing the interrelatedness of the nominally
separate individual negotiations (e.g., exclusivity over one patent is only
valuable if one has access to the other essential patents) or by increasing the
number of negotiations needed (e.g., if two licensees separately negotiate
exclusive contracts allowing access to one of two essential patents, these
licensees would have to undertake an additional level of negotiations with each
other). Moreover, if pools are discouraged from licensing exclusively, then the
general potential transaction costs savings attendant to pooling would be lost.
The potential price efficiencies that pools offer are independent of whether
the pool license is exclusive or nonexclusive. When exclusive out-licensing is
contemplated, a distinct issue regarding which single licensee might be
selected is introduced. That is, will individual licensing and pooling ultimately
result in different exclusive licensees? A primary reason that the value of
exclusivity may vary between licensees is their differing abilities to exploit the
technology at issue successfully. If one assumes that both the individual patent
holders and the pool seek to maximize their respective economic interests,
then, if exclusive licensing was the best way to accomplish this, both avenues
will result in an exclusive license being awarded to the party offering the
highest expected return.
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However, the licensee selection issue is complicated somewhat when a
potential licensee (e.g., MedImmune) is also a patent holder; it is conceivable
that a patent-holder who is also a potential licensee might refuse to license any
third party regardless of merit in the hope of developing the technologies inhouse. This hold-up problem potentially interferes with the selection of the
best exclusive licensee and could arise in both the individual and pool
licensing settings. Though, in the latter setting, the group decision dynamic
may sometimes make it more likely to choose the best licensee. Regarding the
other pluses and minuses of pools, note that a "pool" that is acquired will have
all the out-licensing efficiencies that a conventional pool would have, but
perhaps has somewhat less of a problem regarding the antitrust dangers
attendant to failed pools. On balance, it seems that if allowing exclusive
licensing is valued in the context of independent acquisitions of exclusive
licenses, then it should also be valued in the patent pool context.
In summary, depending upon the circumstances, individual licensing and
licensing through patent pools are likely to have different potential benefits,
with one or the other being more efficient and/or faster depending on the
individual situation. For contexts in which exclusivity is valuable and,
perhaps, even essential, any extra impediments to offer an exclusive license
may profoundly and adversely affect the relative attractiveness of patent
pooling. If development is urgent, hampering the pool channel but allowing
the individual licensing channel would not appear to be good social policy.
Therefore, this Article recommends that the courts are careful that their
approach to analyzing exclusivity in patent pools does not bias their analysis
away from an even-handed approach to exclusivity.
Legal Relationships - Antitrust and PatentLaw

D.

At the risk of oversimplifying, the patent system seeks to promote
innovation through restraining competition. The antitrust system seeks to
promote innovation through protecting competition. A misstep within either
regime (whether it is an improvidently granted patent or an improvidently
instituted antitrust action, for example) can thwart innovation. To what extent
can questionable policies or practices in one regime undermine, or at least be
in tension with, the operation of the other? This last Section discusses key
Patent & Trademark Office ("PTO") pronouncements regarding the
examination of gene-related patents and the formation of gene-related patent
pools. These two milestones provide a useful point of reference for a broader
analysis of the discourse between the competition and patent communities.
In 1999, the PTO issued "Revised Interim Utility Examination Guidelines"
which it then adopted (largely without change) in early 2001.160 The PTO's
press release heralded that it had "published [the] final guidelines for

16

Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1092-99 (Jan. 5, 2001).
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determining utility of gene-related inventions." 1 61 It noted that "[t]he Utility
Guidelines are applicable to all areas of technology. However, they are
particularly relevant in areas of emerging technologies, such as gene-related
technologies ...
1162 In particular, the 2001 guidelines introduced a more
rigorous standard for assessing the utility of gene-related patents than the prior
version in 1995.163 The 1995 guidelines had been widely criticized as too
lenient with respect to the utility requirement as applied to gene-related
technologies. The 2001 reform constituted "a start" in remedying the PTO's
improvident issuance of patents on gene fragments without known
functions.' 6" The ongoing debate (Is the utility standard too harsh? Too
lenient?) regarding the 2001 guidelines is beyond the scope of this Article.
In late 2000, the PTO issued a white paper in which it explicitly
acknowledged concerns regarding the capacity of patents to thwart innovation
in biotechnology.165 According to the PTO,
One of the biggest public concerns voiced against the granting of patents
by the [PTO] to inventions in biotechnology, specifically inventions
based on genetic information, is the potential lack of reasonable access to
that technology for research and development of commercial products
and for further basic biological research.166
The PTO's response to those concerns, at least within its white paper was:
"One possible solution lies in the formation of patent pools."l 6 7 The white
paper did not even mention the PTO's own extensive efforts to revise the
utility guidelines, despite the fact that the final guidelines would be issued less
than two weeks after the white paper's release.
The white paper's discussion of patent pools within the biotechnology
context is strikingly devoid of any concrete examples of actual, proposed, or
possible pools. The absence of such examples has particular consequences for
the PTO's effort to convey multiple important, albeit arguably misguided,
messages - one concerning the law and the other concerning the marketplace
more generally.

161Press Release, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO Publishes Final Guidelines
for Determining Utility of Gene-Related Inventions (Jan. 4, 2001), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/200 1/01 -01/.jsp.
162 Id.
163Anna E. Morrison, Note, The U.S. PTO's New Utility Guidelines: Will They Be
Enough to Secure Gene Patent Rights?, 1 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 142, 143
(2001).
''

Id. at 153.
65 JEANNE CLARK ET AL., U.S.

PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT POOLS: A

SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS? 2-3 (2000), available

at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/patentpool.pdf.
166Id. at 2.
167Id.
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The white paper itself is fairly short and largely amounts to the PTO's
restatement of the general principles that had already become conventional
antitrust wisdom regarding the pro- and anticompetitive effects of patent pools.
It aptly recounts key features of the IP Guidelines and relevant DOJ business
review letters. The PTO's conclusion, drawn without any meaningful
biotechnology-specific antitrust analysis, was that "the social and economic
benefits of [the pooling of biotechnology patents] outweigh their costs." 1 6 8
The white paper fails to acknowledge the myriad difficulties, which this
Article delineates, attendant to merely importing the existing legal guidance
from a standard-setting context in the computer, electronics, and
telecommunications industries to a non-standard setting context involving
Given this significant omission, perhaps the PTO's
biotechnology.169
conclusion that antitrust should not unduly impede patent pool formation
within the biotechnology sector should itself be interpreted as an advocacy
statement rather than as merely a description of the state of the law.
The PTO, and the patent community more broadly, clearly has an important
role to play in the broader discourse regarding the impact of competition policy
in the same manner that the competition community has an important role to
play in the discourse regarding substantive and procedural patent policy
considerations.1 70 Given the centrality of innovation to not only the economy
but also society as a whole, these varied discussions must proceed
concurrently. Nonetheless, in that din, it is important to maintain a realistic
perspective on what patent pooling can and cannot accomplish.
This Article has identified at least two key problems characterizing
antitrust's treatment of patent pools. Or, more accurately, it identified how the
antitrust law has not yet been applied to address a particular type of patent pool
(illustrated through various vaccine industry hypotheticals) and it argued that
merely importing existing norms developed within the standard-setting context
would be a mistake. Has this pocket of legal uncertainty chilled the
development of patent pools within the biotechnology industry?17' That is
certainly a possibility and the competition community and antitrust law can
and must continue to evolve to address this and many other issues. It is,
however, also important to consider whether antitrust has failed to evolve in
this manner owing, in part, to the absence of any strong clamor from the
"IsId. at 8.
169 See, e.g., Tom, supra note 69, at 28 (commenting that biotechnology-based pools are
a "misfit for the existing model" of guidance that is addressed to standards-related pools).
170 See generally Greene, supra note 13.
171See, e.g., Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Efficient Patent Pools, 94 AM. EcoN. REV. 691,
691 (2004) (questioning whether, though not addressing specifically the biotechnology
industry, "the reluctance to form pools may be due to the ambiguities surrounding the

manner in which proposed pools will be evaluated"); Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman,
Fed. Trade Comm'n, Recognizing the Procompetitive Potential of Royalty Discussions in
2005),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/
(Sept.
23,
Setting
7
Standard
speeches/majoras/050923stanford.pdf.
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biotechnology sector to engage in such pooling activities. The competition
community has long recognized what the patent community appears to be
increasingly recognizing, namely, the value of economic reasoning in helping
to inform some of the key tradeoffs within its legal regime. It is also worth
considering whether the frequency with which patent pooling is discussed
within the context of biotechnology is excessive and whether it deflects
attention from more basic concerns that would be better addressed through
other channels.
CONCLUSION

Battling pandemics is, at its core, a matter of science. Waging such battles
also implicates, for better or worse, matters of intellectual property and perhaps
antitrust. While developing vaccines frequently entails a high degree of
uncertainty within the laboratory, society should attempt to minimize the level
of uncertainty regarding antitrust exposure of that development. While the
current rules of thumb provide some unambiguous guidance, they do so only
when little or no technological uncertainty is present. Whether antitrust seeks
to promote innovation or, at a minimum, it merely seeks to avoid impeding
innovation, the competition community must turn a critical eye upon its own
practices. Antitrust's first foray into patent pools took the form of condemning
those which were mere shams used to facilitate price fixing. Its second foray
into this arena largely took the form of identifying a set of patent pools that
were more or less unambiguously procompetitive. Antitrust now has an
obligation to enter into the grey middle zone.

